Risky Business versus Overt Acts: What Relevance Do Actuarial, Probabilistic Risk Assessments Have for Judicial Decisions on Involuntary Psychiatric Hospitalization by Mossman, Douglas, MD
University of Cincinnati College of Law
University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and
Publications
Faculty Lectures and Presentations Faculty Scholarship
1-1-2011
Risky Business versus Overt Acts: What Relevance
Do Actuarial, Probabilistic Risk Assessments Have
for Judicial Decisions on Involuntary Psychiatric
Hospitalization
Douglas Mossman MD
University of Cincinnati College of Law, douglas.mossman@uc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.uc.edu/fac_lect
Part of the Psychology and Psychiatry Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and
Publications. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Lectures and Presentations by an authorized administrator of University of Cincinnati
College of Law Scholarship and Publications. For more information, please contact ken.hirsh@uc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mossman, Douglas MD, "Risky Business versus Overt Acts: What Relevance Do Actuarial, Probabilistic Risk Assessments Have for
Judicial Decisions on Involuntary Psychiatric Hospitalization" (2011). Faculty Lectures and Presentations. Paper 1.
http://scholarship.law.uc.edu/fac_lect/1
11 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 365-454 365
Copyright 0 2011 Douglas Mossman, Allison H. Schwartz, & Elise R. Elam
Houston Journal of Health Law & Policy
ISSN 1534-7907
RISKY BUSINESS VERSUS OVERT ACTS:
WHAT RELEVANCE Do "ACTUARIAL,"
PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENTS HAVE
FOR JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON INVOLUNTARY
PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITALIZATION?
Douglas Mossman, M.D.*
Allison H. Schwartz, J.D.**
Elise R. Elam, J.D.***
I. INTRODUCTION
All jurisdictions' in the United States have statutory provisions
for forcing persons with serious mental illnesses to undergo psychiat-
ric hospitalization. Although statutory wording and criteria vary
from state to state, U.S. laws governing "traditional" mental health
commitmentS2 typically permit judicial authorities to order confine-
Administrative Director, Glenn M. Weaver Institute of Law and Psychiatry, University of Cincinnati College of
Law; Adjunct Professor and Program Director, Division of Forensic Psychiatry, Department of Psychiatry and Be-
havioral Neuroscience, University of Cincinnati College of Medicine. B.A., Oberlin College, 1976; M.D., University
of Michigan Medical School, 1981. The authors express their gratitude to the Weaver Institute for its generous sup-
port of their work.
Attorney at Law, Laconia, New Hampshire. B.A., Vanderbilt University, 2004; J.D. University of Cincinnati College
of Law, 2010.
Attorney at Law, Cincinnati, Ohio. B.A., University of Cincinnati, 2008; J.D. University of Cincinnati College of
Law, 2011.
I See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 327 n.2 (1993) (listing statutes); see also infra Part IV-B.
2 This Article focuses on "traditional" mental health commitments, that is, involuntary hospi-
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ment of individuals who have serious or "substantial" mental disor-
ders that cause "gross" impairments in their functioning, but only if
"clear and convincing" evidence3 shows that those individuals pose
risks of harm to themselves or others. 4
During civil commitment hearings, a portion of the evidence
supporting involuntary hospitalization sometimes comes from non-
professional fact witnesses -family members or acquaintances of the
respondent, or law enforcement officers-who testify about aspects
talization of persons traditionally viewed as needing treatment for severe mental illness.
Such persons typically have psychoses (severe disturbances of thinking) or affective disor-
ders that grossly compromise their ability to perform everyday living tasks. Examples of
such conditions include schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. Our use of "traditional" to de-
scribe mental health commitments follows John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assess-
ment: Forecasting Harm Among Prisoners, Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391, 395, 433-
34 (2006). Professor Monahan, a psychologist, uses the term "traditional" to express the
view held by most mental health professionals that mental health commitments differ im-
portantly from the indefinite confinement of sex offenders allowed by more than twenty
U.S. jurisdictions following completion of a prison term. In upholding sex offender com-
mitments as a constitutional use of state power, the U.S. Supreme Court did not recognize
this distinction. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357-58 (1997) (Kansas sex offender
commitment statute was "plainly of a kind with" mental health commitment laws because
it "require[d] a finding of ... dangerousness" caused by "a 'mental abnormality' or 'person-
ality disorder' that makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the person to control his danger-
ous behavior").
We also note that this Article focuses on criteria for inpatient hospitalization. Forty-four U.S.
jurisdictions permit courts to order "outpatient commitment" under statutes that require
individuals to obtain psychiatric treatment while they live in the community. Marvin S.
Swartz et al., Assessing Outcomes for Consumers in New York's Assisted Outpatient Treatment
Program, 61 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 976, 976 (2010). Often, the statutory requirements permit-
ting outpatient commitment are less stringent than those governing involuntary hospitaliza-
tion. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(9)(c) (McKinney 2006) (criteria for assisted out-
patient treatment require having a mental illness, likelihood of not being safe or
participating in voluntary treatment, likelihood of relapse, previous noncompliance with
treatment, two hospitalizations in last thirty-six months, and violence or threats in the past
four years); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 330.1401(d) (West 2010) (listing criteria for assisted outpa-
tient treatment that differ from criteria for involuntary hospitalization).
3 To satisfy due process, the minimum burden of proof applicable to a civil commitment case
is "'clear and convincing' evidence." Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431, 433 (1979)
("[Tihe precise burden [must be] equal to or greater than the 'clear and convincing' stan-
dard .... ").
4 See Ohio's definition as an example: "'Mental illness' means a substantial disorder of
thought, mood, perception, orientation, or memory that grossly impairs judgment, behav-
ior, capacity to recognize reality, or ability to meet the ordinary demands of life." OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 5122.01(A) (LexisNexis 2008).
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of the respondent's behavior that concerned them and that led to ini-
tiation of the civil commitment process.s In most cases, however, the
crucial evidence bearing on legal satisfaction of commitment criteria
comes from mental health professionals, 6 for only their expert opin-
ion can establish whether the respondent has a mental disorder, the
connection between the disorder and the respondent's troublesome
behavior, and the relationship between the disorder and the respon-
dent's risk to others or himself.7
When twenty-first century healthcare professionals think or talk
about "risk," they typically refer to (or, at least, implicitly mean) a
probability that some future event will occur. In common medical us-
age, "risk" and "probability" have connotations related to group sta-
tistics and beliefs about individuals' health outcomes. To take a famil-
iar example, when physicians say that cigarette smoking raises the
risk of death from cancer or coronary artery disease, they refer to
studies of large groups of smokers and non-smokers showing that the
proportion of smokers who die from these conditions is larger than
the proportion of non-smokers. 8 Physicians also use large-group
trends, patient-specific factors, and clinical intuition to make risk and
probability statements in individual cases. Thus, a physician might
tell a patient that smoking heightens his chance of dying from cancer
or heart disease.9 In both the group and individual cases, health pro-
5 See, e.g., In re Katz, 638 A.2d 684, 686-87 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (discussing testimony of officers).
6 Addington, 441 U.S. at 429 ("Whether the individual is mentally ill and dangerous to either
himself or others and is in need of confined therapy turns on the meaning of the facts which
must be interpreted by expert psychiatrists and psychologists.") (emphasis in original).
7 Almost all states' commitment statutes specify that hospitalization may occur only because
of dangerousness that stems from mental illness. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.735(c) (2010)
(commitment requires clear and convincing evidence that respondent is mentally ill and as
a result is likely to come to harm).
8 The voluminous data supporting these judgments appear in U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, THE HEALTH
CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING, http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data-statistics/sgr/2004/
complete-report/index.htm (last visited March 20, 2011).
9 Under the frequency interpretation of probability, such single-case situations must be con-
sidered to lie within some sort of collective "long sequence of observations." RICHARD VON
MISES, PROBABILITY, STATISTICS, AND TRUTH 15 (Hilda Geiringer trans., 2nd rev. ed. 1957).
Under a "subjective" view, however, the interpretation of single cases is much more
straightforward, and refers to an individual's rational betting decisions. For an introduction,
367
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fessionals' discussions of risks concern outcomes that have not yet
happened but may do so.
Mental health professionals apply similar probabilistic concep-
tions when thinking about the types of risks of harm that are relevant
to civil commitment. Over the past two decades, for example, several
teams of psychologists have developed "actuarial risk assessment in-
struments" (ARAls)10 to aid in quantifying the level of risk -that is,
the probability - that an evaluee will engage in certain kinds of vio-
lent behavior during specified future periods of time. These instru-
ments get the name "actuarial" because they implement a judgment
process similar to methods used by insurance companies to assess
probabilities of certain events (e.g., deaths) and to make decisions
about premiums (e.g., for life insurance)." In both cases, an actuarial
judgment of risk is based on the presence or absence of a limited
number of pre-specified factors with known, empirically established
relationships to an outcome. Although the scope and implementation
styles of ARAls vary, they generally direct mental health profession-
als to gather information about a specific set of "risk factors" -
informational items known to affect the likelihood of violence.12 The
evaluator then assigns numerical values to these factors according to
some preset formula to produce an estimate of risk-a numerical
probability - that the evaluee will act violently during a specified
see RICHARD JEFFREY, SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY: THE REAL THING 1-28 (2002). In this article,
we assume that it makes sense to think of probabilities as applying to individual cases (re-
spondents). For additional discussion of philosophical limits of these positions, see Alan
Hdjek, Interpretations of Probability, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Dec. 31, 2009),
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/probability-interpret/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2010).
10 This abbreviation comes from Stephen D. Hart et al., Precision of Actuarial Risk Assessment
Instruments: Evaluating the 'Margins of Error' of Group v. Individual Predictions of Violence, 190
BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY s60, s60 (2007).
11 Robyn M. Dawes et al., Clinical Versus Actuarial Judgment, 243 SCL 1668, 1668 (1989). We fur-
ther discuss this judgment method infra Section III-C.
12 "A risk factor is a measurable characterization of each subject in a specified population that
precedes the outcome of interest and which can be used to divide the population into two
groups (the high-risk and the low-risk groups that comprise the total population)." Helena
C. Kraemer et al., Coming to Terms with the Terms of Risk, 54 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 337,
338 (1997) (emphasis in original). Note that this definition does not imply that the risk factor
causes the outcome of interest. Epidemiologists term something a causal risk factor if it is a
"variable risk factor that can be shown to be manipulable and, when manipulated, can be
shown to change the risk of the outcome." Id. at 340.
368 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y
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span of time.13
Thus framed, the assessment problem that ARAls address re-
flects the increasing influence of financial thinking on what we mean
when, in ordinary parlance, we speak of risk. We often think about
assessing risk-making judgments about the probability of an out-
come and the magnitude of its consequences -for purposes of decid-
ing how to manage, avert, or insure ourselves against it, a conceptu-
alization that reflects a decidedly economic perspective on risk.14 As
operationalized in finance, risk relates to variation in actual invest-
ment returns around an expected return.15 More generally, we now
tend to perceive and speak of risk as "exposure to a proposition of
which one is uncertain" but for which the outcome has practical im-
portance to us, especially if the outcome involves physical or finan-
cial harm.16
This notion of "risk" as something future and probabilistic dif-
fers subtly but importantly from an older and more traditional usage
of "risk" often encountered in criminal law. In discussing the law on
criminal negligence, for example, a Texas court notes, "Criminal neg-
ligence involves inattentive risk creation. The key to criminal negli-
gence is the failure of the actor to perceive the risk created by his
conduct. Before a charge on criminally negligent homicide is re-
quired, the record must contain evidence showing an unawareness of
the risk."17 Here, the idea that risk is "created" speaks to something
physically present as a result of behavior, rather than to a possibility
or probability. Similarly, the Model Penal Code states, "A person acts
recklessly.. . when he consciously disregards a substantial and un-
justifiable risk that .. . exists or will result from his conduct. The risk
must be of such a nature and degree that ... its disregard involves a
gross deviation from the standard of conduct [of] a law-abiding per-
13 See id. at 338-39.
14 Such is the motivation for what has become known as "modem portfolio theory." Harry M.
Markowitz, Foundations of Portfolio Theory, 46 J. FIN. 469, 469 (1991).
15 AsWATH DAMODARAN, STRATEGIC RISK TAKING: A FRAMEWORK FOR RISK MANAGEMENT 6
(Upper Saddle River: Wharton School Publishing 2008).
16 Glyn A. Holton, Defining Risk, 60 FIN. ANALYSTSJ. 19, 22 (2004).
17 Jackson v. State, 248 S.W.3d 369, 371-72 (Tex. App. 2007) (citations omitted).
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son. . . ."18 Note again that the "risk" is something either present in
the circumstances that the actor should perceive and respond to, or
inherent in the actor's current behavior. That is, risk is a feature of the
situation that the actor can create or fail to heed.
A similar risk-as-present connotation informs "assumption of
risk" doctrine in tort law. In a leading case on this topic, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court observes that, although persons generally are ob-
ligated to exercise "due care to avoid injury to others," in some situa-
tions, such as sporting events:
conditions or conduct that otherwise might be viewed as dan-
gerous often are an integral part of the sport itself. Thus, al-
though moguls on a ski run pose a risk of harm to skiers ... the
challenge and risks posed by the moguls are part of the sport of
skiing, and a ski resort has no duty to eliminate them . . .. [Simi-
larly, i]n some situations,. .. the careless conduct of others is
treated as an 'inherent risk' of a sport, thus barring recovery by
the plaintiff.... [Courts should not] hold a sports participant li-
able to a coparticipant for ordinary careless conduct committed
during the sport ... [because] in the heat of an active sporting
event. . . , a participant's normal energetic conduct often in-
cludes accidentally careless behavior.19
Here, danger and risk are "integral" or "inherent" in an activity,
and the risk of encountering harm is created for or applied to one-
self-that is, "assumed" -through one's presence or participation.
As in the criminal contexts just discussed, the risk is presented by
(and present in) current circumstances or activities.
What about "risk" for purposes of civil commitment? In the
1970s and 1980s, the "present risk" concept seemed to dominate the
development of mental health commitment law. During an era of
statutory revision and legal decisions that some commentators have
termed the "criminalization" of civil commitment,20 several jurisdic-
tions required that the respondent have committed an "overt act" -
actual harm, attempted harm, or threatened harm in some form -as a
18 MODEL PENAL CODE S 2.02(2)(c) (1%2).
19 Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 708, 710 (Cal. 1992).
20 Paul S. Appelbaum, Civil Commitment: Is the Pendulum Changing Direction?, 33 HOSP. &
CommuNTY PSYCHIATRY 703, 703 (1982); S. Jan Brakel, Competency to Stand Trial: Rationalism,
"Contextualism" and Other Modest Theories, 21 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 285, 294 (2003).
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condition of involuntary hospitalization.21 just as in criminal and tort
law, proof of some threatened or actual injury is required, no matter
how serious a respondent's illness or how concerning the possibility
of future harm might seem.
In the last few years, however, scholars from both legal and men-
tal health backgrounds have suggested a contrasting view: properly
grounded evidence for -and hence, legal determinations of -risk for
civil commitment should reflect the probabilistic information gener-
ated by scientifically developed ARAls:
* Psychologists Joel Dvoskin and Kirk Heilbrun advise their col-
leagues that if courts seek "the best available prediction of vio-
lence risk, . .. one should rely on an applicable actuarial tool."22
* Attorney Susan Stefan has argued forcefully that risk assessment
instruments should function as a check against overuse of hospi-
talization.23
* In a series of articles, Professor John Monahan 24 has described,
advocated, and explored the implementation of civil commit-
ment decision-making schemes based on scientifically estimated
probabilities of future violence.
* In discussing the relevance of ARAls in "clinical practice," psy-
chiatrist Alec Buchanan assumes that such an instrument might
"be used in civil commitment determinations" if "its predictive
validity" were "established ... in relation to the kind of behavior
occurring sufficiently close to the point of discharge that, had it
been foreseen, would have justified continued hospitalization." 25
21 See infra Part IV-B for still-existing statutory examples.
22 Joel A. Dvoskin & Kirk Heilbrun, Risk Assessment and Release Decision-Making: Toward Resolv-
ing the Great Debate, 29 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 6, 9 (2001).
23 SUSAN STEFAN, EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT TREATMENT OF THE PSYCHIATRIC PATIENT: POLICY
ISSUES AND LEGAL REQUIREMENTS 73 (Oxford Univ. Press 2006).
24 For more than three decades, Professor Monahan has been regarded as "the leading think-
er" on violence prediction. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 899 n.7 (1983) (quoting State's
expert and citing JOHN MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 47-49
(1981) [hereinafter MONAHAN, CLINICAL PREDICTIONI). Among the many other decisions that
cite his work are Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 344 n.10 (Cal. 1976) and
Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 323 (1993).
25 Alec Buchanan, Risk of Violence by Psychiatric Patients: Beyond the "Actuarial Versus Clinical"
Assessment Debate, 59 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 184, 188 (2008).
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* Psychologists Nicholas Scurich and Richard John have explored
ways that "framings" of information based from ARAls might
affect decisions about civil commitment-a study in which the
authors assume "that the way the probability is framed will be
consequential for involuntarily civil commitment decisions." 26
Writers cited in the preceding paragraphs assume that civil
commitment decision-makers will accept and embrace scientifically
supported statements of risk-as-probability. But if faced with such in-
formation, should courts actually respond this way? More specifi-
cally, would it be legally appropriate for a court to order the involun-
tary hospitalization of a respondent who had committed no overt act
of violence solely because an ARAI established an elevated probabil-
ity of violence? In this Article, we suggest this answer: "In some ju-
risdictions, maybe; in most jurisdictions, probably not." To our
knowledge, just a few written decisions mention the use of an ARAI
in "traditional" mental health commitment cases, and no decision has
expressly relied on or endorsed ARAI-based information as the de-
terminative factor in favor of commitment. 27 As this Article shall
show, only a minority of states have statutory language that appears
broad enough to let ARAI-based evidence be the chief justification for
ordering involuntary psychiatric hospitalization.
We proceed as follows. In Part II, we provide a short review of
the development of civil commitment case law and statutory provi-
sions therein, particularly the "overt act" requirement. In Part III, we
explain the development and status of ARAls potentially relevant to
civil commitment. Our Article's chief contribution comes in Part IV,
in which we examine U.S. commitment statutes and related case law
as it might bear upon use of ARAls to justify involuntary hospitaliza-
tion. In Part V, we summarize the implications of these findings for
future use of ARAI-based probabilities as supportive evidence in fa-
vor of involuntary psychiatric hospitalization.
26 Nicholas Scurich & Richard S. John, The Effect of Framing Actuarial Risk Probabilities on Invol-
untary Civil Commitment Decisions, L. & HUM. BEHAV. 3 DOI 10.1007/sl0979-010-9218-4 (pub-
lished online Feb. 10, 2010). In a related article, these authors assume that commitment deci-
sions would be based on risk that exceeds a particular probabilistic threshold. Nicholas
Scurich & Richard John, The Normative Threshold for Psychiatric Civil Commitment, 50
JURIMETRICS J. 425, 425 (2010).
27 We discuss these infra Section IV-A.
372
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II. DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN CIVIL COMMITMENT STATUTES
A. Mental Health Commitment Before the 1960s
In 1961, the American Bar Association published an analysis of
then-existing state statutes governing involuntary hospitalization. 28
In the late 1950s, just seven states required some sort of dangerous-
ness (to self, others, or property) as justification for involuntary hos-
pitalization.29 In twenty-two states, simply needing care or treatment
was sufficient grounds, and seven other states permitted commit-
ment if it seemed necessary for the patient's welfare or the welfare of
others.30 Massachusetts permitted commitment of persons deemed
"likely" to violate "the established laws, ordinances, conventions, or
morals of the community."31 Seventeen states had no specific statu-
tory criteria for commitment, apparently leaving the choice of ration-
ale entirely to legal decision-makers. 32
Moreover, the legal mechanisms that led to mental health com-
mitments gave respondents few procedural protections. In twelve
states, a commitment decision could take place without a judge's or-
der (though a court might later review the decision).33 Instead, ad-
ministrative tribunals of varying composition-sometimes made up
of just two physicians, sometimes including physicians and other of-
ficers -made decisions about involuntary hospitalization that a court
might later review.34 Fewer than half the states required that persons
receive notice of the hearing on their involuntary hospitalization. 35
Just seventeen states made legal representation available to individu-
28 FRANK T. LINDMAN & DONALD M. MCINTYRE, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW,
REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION 4 (1961).
29 Id. at 44-51 (tables).
30 Id. at 49-51.
31 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 1 (1957).
32 LINDMAN & MCINTYRE, supra note 28, at 49-51 (tables showing no specified criteria for CO,
DE, KY, MD, MI, MS, NE, NJ, NY, NC, ND, SD, UT, VT, VA, WV, and WY).
33 Id. (tables showing no specific criteria for CO, DE, MD, MS, NE, NC, ND, SD, VT, VA, WV,
and WY).
34 Id. at 63-65 (tables).
35 Id. at 49-51, 56-59, 63-65 (tables).
373
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als facing commitment proceedings (with only fifteen states specify-
ing arrangements for attorney compensation).36 The standard of
proof by which courts needed to evaluate evidence was largely un-
specified.
B. Changes in Commitment Statutes
At the time, civil commitment often meant confinement for sev-
eral months or years at state mental hospitals where, with few excep-
tions, patients typically received "care" that was at best custodial and
at worst abominable.37 Revelations about conditions in state hospi-
tals, concerns about costs of housing patients, and the advent of effec-
tive psychotropic medications, led, in the 1960s, to a changing public
perception of mental illness and its treatment.38 In response, state leg-
36 Id. The U.S. Supreme Court had not yet established a constitutional guarantee of appointed
counsel for indigent felony defendants, let alone persons charged with lesser criminal of-
fenses that might lead to confinement. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972)
("[A]bsent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense,
whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel
at his trial."); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963).
37 In a 1958 presidential address to the American Psychiatric Association, Dr. Harry Solomon
told his colleagues that these institutions were "antiquated, outmoded, and rapidly becom-
ing obsolete.... [Tihey are bankrupt beyond remedy. I believe, therefore, that our large
mental hospitals should be liquidated as rapidly as can be done ..... Harry C. Solomon,
The American Psychiatric Association in Relation to American Psychiatry, Presidential Address,
115 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1, 7 (July 1958).
In 1961, Albert Deutsch gave a U.S. Senate committee this stark description of state hospital
patients' living conditions:
Some physicians I interviewed frankly admitted that the animals of nearby pig-
geries were better housed, fed and treated than many of the patients on their
wards. I saw hundreds of sick people shackled, strapped, straitjacketed, and
bound to their beds. I saw mental patients forced to eat meals with their hands
because there were not enough spoons and other tableware to go around .... I
found evidence of physical brutality, but that paled into insignificance when
compared with the excruciating suffering stemming from prolonged, enforced
idleness, herdlike crowding, lack of privacy, depersonalization, and the overall
atmosphere of neglect.
Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill, HEARINGS BEFORE THE SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHlS OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE JUDICIARY, 87th Congress, 2nd Session at
40-41 (1961).
38 David A. Rochefort, Origins of the "Third Psychiatric Revolution": The Community Mental
Health Centers Act of 1963, 9 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 2,4-6, 20 (1984).
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islatures rewrote commitment laws to encourage community treat-
ment rather than institutionalization.39 The most significant of these
laws, California's Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS), expressly aimed
"to end the inappropriate, indefinite, and involuntary commitment of
mentally disordered persons." 40 LPS ultimately "shaped a generation
of commitment statutes across the country" 41 that reflected an emerg-
ing social consensus: institutionalized mental patients-along with
other previously marginalized groups -should enjoy the full benefits
of U.S. civil rights protections.
Passage of these statutes coincided with several court decisionS42
that elaborated the substantive and procedural due process rights of
individuals subject to civil commitment. For present purposes, the
most significant of these cases is Lessard v. Schmidt,43 a 1972 Wiscon-
sin federal district court decision that sparked a nationwide trans-
formation in civil commitment statutes. The case centered on the au-
tumn 1971 hospitalization of Alberta Lessard following ex parte
proceedings of which she never received notice."4 With the help of
Milwaukee Legal Services, Miss Lessard brought a federal class ac-
tion suit seeking to prevent enforcement of Wisconsin's involuntary
39 See, e.g., Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5001 (West 2010).
40 Id. at §5001(a).
41 Paul S. Appelbaum, Ambivalence Codified: California's New Outpatient Commitment Statute, 54
PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 26,26 (2003).
42 See, e.g., Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657, 661 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (requiring trial court to consider
whether "other alternative courses of treatment" or interventions less restrictive than hospi-
talization might suffice); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975) ("a State cannot
constitutionally confine without more [justification] a nondangerous individual who is ca-
pable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible
family members or friends."); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F.Supp 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), 334
F.Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), 344 F.Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd sub. nom.; Wyatt v. Ad-
erholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (finding a right to treatment and imposing rules for its
implementation); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432-433 (1979) (Constitution requires
"clear and convincing" proof of elements of commitment); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494
(1980) (State may not classify a convict as mentally ill and "subject him to involuntary psy-
chiatric treatment without affording him additional due process protections"); Jackson v.
Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972) (duration of commitment must bear a reasonable relation-
ship to the purpose of commitment).
43 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), on reh'g, 379 F. Supp. 1376
(E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), reinstated, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
44 Id. at 1081.
RISKY BUSINESS VERSUS OVERT ACTS 375
HeinOnline  -- 11 Hous. J. Health L. & Pol'y 375 2011
commitment statute.45
Noting that civil commitment entailed consequenceS46 at least as
significant as those that followed criminal conviction, the Lessard
court ruled that to commit someone, the state must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the person was mentally ill and "that if the
person is not confined he will do immediate harm to himself or oth-
ers."47 Civil commitment might be justified only if an individual had
committed "a recent overt act, attempt or threat to do substantial
harm to oneself or another." 48 Even then, someone who had tried to
kill himself should not be committed unless he still posed an "imme-
diate danger at the time of the hearing of doing further harm to
[himlself." 49 In addition to requiring "proof beyond a reasonable
doubt" of criteria for commitment, Lessard held that persons facing
potential involuntary hospitalization were entitled to several other
constitutional protections afforded to accused criminals.50 Although
Lessard was binding only in Wisconsin, it became the impetus for
several other courts and many state legislatures to revise commit-
ment laws such that an "overt act" would be required to demonstrate
dangerousness. 51
45 Id. at 1082.
46 At the time, these included loss of the ability to make contracts, restrictions on professional
licenses, loss of the right to vote and marry, and even a prohibition against driving. "In
some respects," said the Lessard court, "the civil deprivations which follow civil commit-
ment are more serious than the deprivations which accompany a criminal conviction." Id. at
1088-89.
47 Id. at 1093, 1095.
48 Id. at 1093.
49 Id. at 1093 n.24.
50 These conditions included prompt notice of the allegations justifying the detention; a prob-
able cause hearing within 48 hours of detention; a full hearing on commitment within two
weeks; representation by counsel; a hearsay prohibition; a privilege against
"self-incrimination" (i.e., a warning that statements made to evaluators could be used to
support commitment); and requiring that those seeking hospitalization consider other, less
restrictive alternatives. Id. at 1103.
51 Reed Groethe, Overt Dangerous Behavior as a Constitutional Requirement for Involuntary Civil
Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 562 (1977); see also Douglas S. Stransky,
Comment: Civil Commitment and the Right to Refuse Treatment: Resolving Disputes from
a Due Process Perspective, 50 U. Miami L. Rev. 413, 419 (1996).
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C. Current requirements of commitment criteria
Although some statutes have undergone modification over the
last two decades, public safety is still the dominant rationale for men-
tal health commitments. What is often termed "dangerousness" in
statutes and court decisions remains the primary emphasis in com-
mitment proceedings, coupled with a showing that a "substantial
mental disorder" is the cause of the dangerousness.
1. Mental Disorder
Most (if not all) major legal decisions dealing with civil commit-
ment treat having a mental disorder as a requirement so fundamental
and obvious that it is left unstated.52 Civil commitment statutes de-
fine mental disorder in a wide variety of ways, 53 but in most states,
the definition does not refer to recognized psychiatric diagnoses or
use medical terminology. For example, Michigan law specifies that
commitment requires "a substantial disorder of thought or mood that
significantly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize real-
ity, or ability to cope with the ordinary demands of life."5 Diagnostic
52 David W. Burgett, Substantive Due Process Limits on the Duration of Civil Commitment for the
Treatment of Mental Illness, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 205, 223 n.84 (1981). In a 1972 decision
that sets limits on pre-trial commitment for restoration of adjudicative competence, the U.S.
Supreme Court accepts as a given that states "have traditionally exercised broad power to
commit persons found to be mentally ill." Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 736 (1972).
53 Some jurisdictions' definitions of mental illness are circular. For example, New York law
defines "mental illness" as "an affliction with a mental disease or mental condition which is
manifested by a disorder or disturbance in behavior, feeling, thinking, or judgment to such
an extent that the person afflicted requires care, treatment and rehabilitation," N.Y. MENTAL
HYG. LAW § 1.03(20) (2006), and that needing care and treatment "means that a person has a
mental illness for which in-patient care and treatment in a hospital is appropriate," N.Y.
MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.01 (20) (2006).
54 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §330.14 0 0(g) (West 2010). For examples of very similar statutory
definitions, see ALA. CODE § 22-52-1.1(1) (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2010), ARiz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 36-501(22), (West 2009) IDAHO CODE ANN. §66-317(12) (2007), 104 MASS. CODE REGS.
§ 27.05(1)(2006), MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.02(13)(a) (West Supp. 2011), N.J. STAT. ANN. §
30:4-27.2(r), OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.01(A) (LexisNexis 2008), OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
43A, §1-103(3) (West 2001), S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 27A-1-1(18) (West 2004), VT. STAT. ANN. 18
§ 7101(14) (LexisNexis 2000), and WIS. STAT. §51.001 (13)(b) (West 2008). Nevada takes a dif-
ferent approach, defining mental illness for purpose of commitment as "a clinically signifi-
cant disorder" listed in official diagnostic manuals that "[s]eriously limits" a person's capac-
ity "to function in the primary aspects of daily living." NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 433.164
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terminology is used, however, in several states' laws to designate
conditions that disqualify persons from being eligible for involuntary
psychiatric hospitalization.55 For example, many jurisdictions' statu-
tory language explicitly precludes substance abuse disorders from
being the sole grounds for involuntary psychiatric hospitalization. 56
How, then, is the presence of the requisite disorder to be proven?
Notwithstanding the skeptical opinions of psychiatric expertise often
voiced in legal opinions,57 many jurisdictions require a mental health
professional's opinion testimony in commitment proceedings-a re-
quirement that obviates questions as to whether such experts' evi-
dence meets criteria for admissibility.58 Virtually all states require an
(LexisNexis 2009).
55 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-501(26) (LexisNexis 2009) Arizona's civil commitment
statute specifically excludes "drug abuse, alcoholism or mental retardation," and "personal-
ity disorders characterized by lifelong and deeply ingrained antisocial behavior patterns,
including [illegal] sexual behaviors" unless these are also accompanied by "a substantial
disorder of the person's emotional processes, thought, cognition or memory." Id.
56 See, e.g., id.; KAN. STAT. ANN. §59-2946(f)(1) (2005); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §71.05.040 (West
2008).
However, several states permit judicial commitment of an individual with substance use
disorders and no other major mental illness if the individual poses a substantial risk of
physical harm to himself or others. In some states, statutes concerning civil commitment of
mentally ill persons include, in their definition of mental illness or mental disorder, persons
who have alcohol and/or drug use disorders. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 12-7-2-130 (LexisNexis
2006) ("Mental illness ... includes. .. alcoholism, and addiction to narcotics or dangerous
drugs."); ME. REV. STAT. 34-B §3801(5) (2010) ("'Mentally ill person' includes persons suffer-
ing from the effects of the use of drugs, narcotics, hallucinogens or intoxicants, including al-
cohol."); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 51.15(1)(a), 51.01(8) (West 2008) (allowing detention of "drug
dependent" persons). In other states, laws concerning alcohol and drug abuse commitments
are separate from the statutes pertaining to commitment of mentally ill persons. See, e.g.,
COL. REV. STAT. §§ 27-81-102(1), 27-81-112 (LexisNexis 2010) (permitting commitment if a
"person is an alcoholic and ... has threatened or attempted to inflict or inflicted physical
harm on himself or on another"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 397.675 (West 2006) ("A person meets
the criteria for involuntary admission if the person is substance abuse impaired. .. " and sat-
isfies other conditions); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-52-10 (West 2002) (permitting involuntary
commitment of "chemically dependent" persons who have been violent, have physical
problems, or have repeatedly had substance-related legal problems).
57 See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979) (citing "the lack of certainty and the
fallibility of psychiatric diagnosis" and doubting "whether a state could ever prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that an individual is both mentally ill and likely to be dangerous").
58 For a discussion of this topic, see Robert F. Schopp & Michael R. Quattrocchi, Predicting the
present: Expert testimony and civil commitment 13 BEHAv. SC. & L. 159 (1995) (examining civil
commitment testimony in light of the then-recent Daubert decision).
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examination by a physician or psychologist as the basis for a petition
for commitment,59 giving professional expertise a key role in initiat-
ing the civil commitment process. Some states' statutes require that
mental health professionals testify about one or more matters that are
at issue in making the commitment decision. 60 In other states (e.g.,
California), case law implies that mental health testimony is required
to establish the legal basis for commitment.61 This only makes sense:
though commitment decisions hinge in part on what the Supreme
Court terms "factual issues," such as the respondent's behavior, find-
ing out whether a respondent is mentally ill and needs hospitaliza-
tion requires that facts "be interpreted by expert psychiatrists and
psychologists." 62
59 Alexander W. Scherr, Daubert & Danger: The "Fit" of Expert Predictions in Civil Comitnients,
55 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 38 (2003).
60 See, e.g., 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 § 3-807 (2010) ("No respondent may be found subject to in-
voluntary admission on an inpatient or outpatient basis unless at least one psychiatrist, clin-
ical social worker, or clinical psychologist who has examined him testifies in person at the
hearing."); R.I. GEN. LAWS §40.1-5-8(f) (LexisNexis 2006) ("A person with respect to whom a
court hearing has been ordered under this section shall have and be informed of a right to
employ a mental health professional of his or her choice to assist him or her in connection
with the hearing and to testify on his or her behalf."); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 34-B §3864-5-F
(2010) ("In each case, the applicant shall submit to the court, at the time of the hearing, tes-
timony, including expert psychiatric testimony, indicating the individual treatment plan to
be followed by the psychiatric hospital staff."); OHio REV. CODE ANN. §5122.14 (LexisNexis
2008) ("the court may appoint a psychiatrist ... to examine the respondent, and at the first
hearing ... such psychiatrist, or licensed clinical psychologist and licensed physician, shall
report to the court his findings as to the mental condition of respondent, and his need for
custody, care, or treatment in a mental hospital."); WIS. STAT. ANN. §51.20(9)(a)(5) (West
2008) ("The examiners shall personally observe and examine the subject individual at any
suitable place and satisfy themselves, if reasonably possible, as to the individual's mental
condition, and shall make independent reports to the court ... [a] written report shall be
made of all such examinations and filed with the court. The report and testimony. .. shall
be based on beliefs to a reasonable degree of medical certainty . .. in regard to the existence
of the conditions [required for involuntary commitment], and the appropriateness of vari-
ous treatment modalities or facilities.").
61 See, e.g., People v. Bennett, 182 Cal. Rptr. 473, 497-98 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982); People v. Devers,
No. A095661, 2002 WL 724931, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2002).
62 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979).
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2. "Risk" or "Dangerousness"
a. Meaning of Dangerousness
Historically, the putative "dangerousness" of mentally ill per-
sons has been the core social and legal rationale for involuntary psy-
chiatric hospitalization, 63 with mental incompetence or unrecognized
need for treatment being ancillary factors in just a few states' com-
mitment laws.64 Several decades ago, forensic psychiatrist Melvin
Goldzband identified the types of concerns animating authors of in-
voluntary hospitalization statutes in this definition of dangerousness:
"the quality of an individual or a situation leading to the potential or
actuation of harm to an individual, community or social order. It is
inherent in this definition that dangerousness is not necessarily de-
structive .. .. "6
People often use the words "dangerous" or "dangerousness" to
refer to (and sometimes, to conflate) factors on which judgments
about dangerousness are based, the types of dangerous events being
predicted, and the probability of those events.66 For these reasons, re-
cent social science scholarship has focused on "risk assessment" and
"risk communication" rather than the once-common but infelicitous
"prediction of dangerousness," a topic to which we shall return
63 John Monahan, Mental Disorder and Violent Behavior: Perceptions and Evidence, 47 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 511, 512-13 (1992) (giving historical examples).
64 See infra Part IV-B.
65 Melvin G. Goldzband, Dangerousness, 1 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 238, 238 (1973).
66 See John Monahan & Henry J. Steadman, Toward a Rejuvenation of Risk Assessment Research, in
VIOLENCE AND MENTAL DISORDER: DEVELOPMENTS IN RISK ASSESSMENT 1, 2 (John Monahan &
Henry J. Steadman eds., 1994). As several writers have noted, "dangerousness," "danger-
ous," and "danger" are words that, in ordinary usage, designate various things: actual
manifestations of aggressive behavior (including threats, acts that have harmful potential,
and/or acts that actually result in harm); an especially large probability of causing harm; or
any probability (great or small) of acting violently. For additional discussion, see Douglas
Mossman, Understanding Risk Assessment Instruments, in THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC
PUBLISHING TEXTBOOK OF FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 563,563-64 (R.I. Simon & L.H. Gold, 2nd ed.,
2010) 563, 563-564 (2010) [hereinafter Mossman, Understanding]; Saleem A. Shah, Dangerous-
ness: A Paradigm for Exploring Some Issues in Law and Psychology, 33 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 224,
224-25 (1978); Douglas Mossman, Dangerousness Decisions: An Essay on the Mathematics of
Clinical Violence Predictions and Involuntary Hospitalization, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 95,
101 (1995).
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shortly.67
In many jurisdictions, statutes eliminate at least some of the am-
biguity in "danger" and "dangerousness" by directing courts and
evaluators to focus primarily on a respondent's recent actions (in-
cluding utterances). In Pennsylvania, for example, "clear and present
danger to others" is limited to severely mentally ill persons for whom
clear and convincing evidence establishes:
that within the past 30 days the person has inflicted or at-
tempted to inflict serious bodily harm on another and that there
is a reasonable probability that such conduct will be re-
peated.... [A] clear and present danger of harm to others may
be demonstrated by proof that the person has made threats of
harm and has committed acts in furtherance of the threat to
commit harm.68
This language strongly suggests that some actual behavior (which
may be a threat -a form of verbal behavior) is a necessary condition
for ordering involuntary hospitalization.69 As we shall see shortly,70 it
appears that in most U.S. jurisdictions, a respondent is eligible for
commitment only if he has a serious mental illness, did something
threatening or harmful because of the illness, and still has the mental
problems that led to the threatening or actually harmful behavior.
Under such requirements, commitment decisions do not depend on
probabilistic assessments about future behavior, but on the respon-
dent's past deeds (including statements) that arose from mental con-
ditions that continue to be present.
b. Types of Dangerousness
(i) To Self or Others
All states permit civil commitment of persons whose mental ill-
ness has rendered them physically dangerous to themselves, 71 either
67 See infra Part III.
68 50 PA. STAT. ANN. § 7301(b)(1) (West 1976).
69 As we note below, statutes in many jurisdictions further specify that the behavior must
have occurred "recently," e.g., within the last month. See infra Part II(c)(2)(b)(iii).
70 See infra Part IV-B (citing statutory requirements of most U.S. jurisdictions).
71 See infra Part IV-B; see also Robert A. Brooks, Psychiatrists' Opinions About Involuntary Civil
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through suicidal behavior (that is, threats of or attempts to take one's
own life) or acts that are physically harmful but not life-threatening
(e.g., self-mutilation). Almost all states also permit commitment be-
cause of what often is termed "grave disability," a phrase referring to
the condition of persons who do not express wishes or try to harm
themselves, but who so neglect their basic needS72 as to put their lives
in peril.73 Finally, all states permit civil commitment of persons for
whom clear and convincing evidence shows they are physically dan-
gerous to others.74
Commitment: Results of a National Survey, 35 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 219, 219 (2007) (cit-
ing C.D. Stromberg, A.A. Stone, A Model State Law on Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 20
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 275 (1983)).
72 Examples of such physical neglect include not eating, not dressing properly or seeking ade-
quate shelter in cold weather, and not attending to one's life-threatening medical condi-
tions. In most states (e.g., Ohio, see OHIo REV. CODE § 5122.01(B)(1)-(3) (LexisNexis 2008)),
commitment laws distinguish between intentionally self-harming behavior and self-neglect
separately. Some statutes, however, subsume suicidal behavior and grave disability under a
unitary danger-to-self rubric. See, e.g., 50 PA. STAT. ANN. § 7301(b)(2)(i) (West 1976) (danger
to self provable by showing that the respondent "has acted in such manner as to evidence
that he would be unable, without care, supervision and the continued assistance of others,
to satisfy his need for nourishment, personal or medical care, shelter, or self-protection and
safety... .").
In four states where commitment statutes do not mention grave disability explicitly, courts
have interpreted phrases referring to "danger to self" as allowing commitment for being
" gravely disabled." Robert A. Brooks, Psychiatrists' Opinions About Involuntary Civil Com-
mitment: Results ofa National Survey, 35 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 219, 221 (2007); see Ruff
v. Cent. State Hosp., 385 S.E.2d 734, 735-36 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989); In re Albright, 836 P.2d 1, 4-
5 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992); State v. Christofferson, 615 P.2d 1152, 1153 (Or. Ct. App.1980); G.H.
v. State, 96 S.W.3d 629, 633 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002).
An interesting exception is Arizona's civil commitment statute, which specifically excludes
involuntary hospitalization based on "behavior that establishes only the condition of grave-
ly disabled." ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-501(6)(b) (Supp. 2010).
73 Kansas permits commitment of a mentally ill person who "is substantially unable... to
provide for any of the person's basic needs, such as food, clothing, shelter, health or safety,
causing a substantial deterioration of the person's ability to function on the person's own."
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2946(f)(3) (2005). Wisconsin permits civil commitment if a mentally ill
person "[elvidences behavior manifested by recent acts or omissions" and thereby creates
"a substantial probability ... that death, serious physical injury, serious physical debilita-
tion, or serious physical disease will imminently ensue" without prompt psychiatric treat-
ment. Wis. STAT. ANN. §51.20(1)(a)(2)(d) (West 2008).
74 Many states require that respondents have displayed behavioral evidence of violence towards
others in the form of credible threats, attempts to harm others, or actually harmful deeds.
See infra Part IV-B.
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(ii) Other Types of Risk
O'Connor v. Donaldson prohibits states from using need for treat-
ment as the sole justification for involuntary hospitalization 5, and
some states have incorporated the language of this constitutional
judgment in their statutes.76 In some jurisdictions, however, need for
treatment combined with some other form of severe mental compro-
mise permits a court to order civil commitment.77 A few states explic-
itly include risk of property damage among their criteria for civil
commitment.78 At least three states- Minnesota, South Dakota, and
Wisconsin -have statutes that authorize civil commitment of women
who abuse alcohol during pregnancy; 79 here, the rationale for deten-
75 See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975) ("[A] State cannot constitutionally con-
fine without more [justification] a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving
safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible family members or
friends.").
76 See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)(2)(d) (West 2008) (stating that "no substantial probability of
harm" justifying civil commitment "exists if reasonable provision for the individual's
treatment and protection is available in the community"); FLA. STAT. ANN. §394.467(2)(a)
(West 2006) (permitting commitment of someone who "is manifestly incapable of surviving
alone or with the help of willing and responsible family or friends").
77 For example, Ohio allows involuntary hospitalization of a person with grossly compro-
mised judgment, behavior, reality-testing, or capacity to manage basic tasks of living who
"[wiould benefit from treatment in a hospital for the person's mental illness and is in need
of such treatment as manifested by evidence of behavior that creates a grave and imminent
risk to substantial rights of others or the person." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.01(B)(4)
(LexisNexis 2008). South Carolina allows for commitment of a "person [who] is mentally ill,
needs involuntary treatment and because of his condition lacks sufficient insight or capacity
to make responsible decisions with respect to his treatment." S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-17-
580(1)(2002).
78 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.915(10)(A)-(B)(2010) (permitting involuntary hospitalization
of a mentally ill person whose "recent behavior" has included "causing, attempting, or
threatening harm," and who "is likely in the near future to cause ... substantial property
damage to another person"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.020(23)(a)(iii)(West 2008) (al-
lowing civil commitment upon showing "a substantial risk that ... physical harm will be in-
flicted by a [mentally ill] person upon the property of others, as evidenced by behavior
which has caused substantial loss or damage to the property of others").
79 Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 48.193(1)(c)(West 2008) (permitting commitment of an expectant mother
if her "habitual lack of self-control in the use of alcohol beverages... exhibited to a severe
degree [creates] a substantial risk that the physical health of the unborn child, and of the
child when bom, will be seriously affected or endangered"); see also MINN. STAT. ANN. §
253B.02 Subd. 2 (West 2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-20A-70(3)(2004).
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tion and hospitalization is to reduce potential harm to the fetus. 80 Fi-
nally, about one-third of U.S. states permit commitment of individu-
als who are at risk for relapse of their mental illness or mental dete-
rioration.81
(iii) Evidence of Risk
Earlier, we noted that Lessard v. Schmidt required that the re-
spondent must have made an actual threat or must have committed
some actual behavior -more simply, an "overt act" -as the basis for
inferring dangerousness. 82 Shortly after Lessard was issued, eight
states altered their commitment statutes to require an overt act to jus-
tify commitment, and several state and federal courts held that the
U.S. constitution required an "overt act" as proof of dangerousness.83
In several jurisdictions, however, decisions have specifically rejected
an overt act requirement,84 and as Part IV-B shall show, statutes in a
80 Excessive alcohol consumption during pregnancy is incontrovertibly associated with ad-
verse health consequences for the fetus. Fetal alcohol exposure may be the most common
nonhereditary cause of mental retardation, and can lead to a variety of other physical and
neurodevelopmental disorders. See generally Kenneth R. Warren & Laurie L. Foudin, Alco-
hol-Related Birth Defects: The Past, Present, and Future, 25 ALCOHOL RES. & HEALTH 153, 155
(2001).
81 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.020(17)(b)(West 2008) (permitting commitment of
someone whose mental illness is causing a "severe deterioration in routine functioning evi-
denced by repeated and escalating loss of cognitive or volitional control"); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.e (West 2008) (person may be civilly committed when recent behavior indi-
cates that "he or she will, if left untreated,... suffer severe mental, emotional, or physical
harm that will result in the loss of the individual's ability to function independently in the
community or the loss of cognitive or volitional control over his or her thoughts or ac-
tions"); ALA. CODE § 22-52-10.4(a)(ii)-(iii) (1975) (permitting commitment only if respondent
both "poses a real and present threat of substantial harm to self and/or others" and "will, if
not treated, continue to suffer mental distress and will continue to experience deterioration
of the ability to function independently. . .
82 See supra Part II-B.
83 Reed Groethe, Overt Dangerous Behavior as a Constitutional Requirement for Involuntary Civil
Commitment of the Mentally 111, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 562 n.1 (1977) (citing statutes).
84 See, e.g., People v. Sansone, 309 N.E.2d 733, 739 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974); United States ex rel.
Mathew v. Nelson, 461 F. Supp. 707, 707 (N.D. Ill. 1978), Matter of Monroe, 270 S.E.2d 537,
541 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980); Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 961 (2d Cir. 1983); People
v. Stevens, 761 P.2d 768, 773 (Colo. 1988). In Washington state, courts have required overt
acts to prove risk of physical harm, (In re Harris, 654 P.2d 109, 113 (Wash. 1982)), but not
grave disability, (In re LaBelle, 728 P.2d 138, 144 (Wash. 1986)).
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minority of states appear to allow other evidence as potential proof of
dangerousness.
The Lessard decision also required the overt act be "recent," and
some other "overt act" jurisdictions impose similar conditions.85 In a
few states, statutes specify a period within which the behavior must
have occurred to count in favor of commitment.86 Those court deci-
sions that discuss recentness requirements have not set clear rules
specifying the time within which an act remains "recent" enough for
purposes of commitment.87 Instead, courts have ruled that actions
need only be "material and relevant to the [respondent's] present
condition"88 or have "occurred close enough in time to the ... hear-
ing to have probative value on the ultimate question before the
court . . . ."89
Although proving that a respondent has a mental disorder
would appear to require the expertise of a mental health professional,
testimony relevant to risk and danger - particularly whether the re-
spondent committed any overt acts of violence-might well come
from nonprofessionals who, for example, actually saw pre-detention
behavior that raised concern about the respondent's dangerousness.90
Several states have case law establishing the potential sufficiency of
85 Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1093 (E.D. Wis. 1972); see, e.g., In re Gatson, 593 P.2d
423,424-25 (Kan. Ct. App. 1979) (overt act jurisdiction).
86 See, e.g., 50 PA. STAT. ANN. § 7301(b) (West 2010) (in Pennsylvania, "determination of present
danger" relates to behavior within the previous 30 days); see also, NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
433A.115(2) (LexisNexis 2009) (Nevada requires "determination of present danger" to be
based on behavior within the previous 30 days); H.B. 3076, 61st Leg., 2010 Reg. Sess. (Wash.
2010) ("recent" means "a period of time not exceeding three years prior to the current hear-
ing.").
87 Alexander Scherr, Daubert & Danger: The "Fit" of Expert Predictions in Civil Commitments, 55
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 46-47 (2003).
88 In re D.D., 920 P. 2d 973, 975 (Mont. 1996).
89 Davis v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Res., 465 S.E.2d 2, 8 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995). Ver-
mont, which does not have a recency requirement, nonetheless applies the principle that
"[olvert acts occurring shortly before the hearing may be given more weight than remote
acts ..... In re L.R., 497 A.2d 753, 756 (Vt. 1985).
90 See, e.g., Hill v. State, 358 So. 2d 190, 207 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); People v. Hockenberry,
No. A095277, No. A095277 2002 WL 1000075, at *3-4 (Cal. Ct. App. May 16, 2002); People v.
Sword, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 810, 818 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
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lay testimony alone to prove dangerousness. 91 But do mental health
professionals have anything to offer courts beyond observations of
actual violent behavior of the sort that nonprofessionals might equal-
ly well provide?
III. DEVELOPMENT AND CURRENT STATUS OF RISK ASSESSMENT
A. Actuarial Judgment
Writing in 2003, Professor Scherr noted that despite profound
doubt among mental health professionals as to the value of psychiat-
ric predictions, 92 "no appellate court has ever ordered exclusion of
expert psychiatric testimony about danger in a civil commitment
case." 93 This is striking, because until the early 1990s, mental health
professionals believed that they could not distinguish persons who
would become violent from those who would not, especially when
such assessments concerned conduct several months or years in the
future.94 Moreover, mental health professionals believed that their
predictions of violence usually were wrong.95
91 See Hill, 358 So. 2d at 207; Hockenberry, 2002 WL 1000075 at *3-4; Sword, 34 Cal. Rptr. at 818.
92 See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 697 F.2d 593, 596 (5th Cir. 1983) ("[The testifying psychiatrists]
disagreed over the degree of certainty with which future conduct could be predicted, but
this only shows a difference of opinion among professionals-no rarity to the courts or to cit-
izens who serve as jurors."); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 472 (1981) ("[Slome in the psy-
chiatric community are of the view that clinical predictions as to whether a person would or
would not commit violent acts in the future are 'fundamentally of very low reliability' and
that psychiatrists possess no special qualifications for making such forecasts.").
93 Scherr, supra note 87, at 26-27 (citing Brief for Amicus Curiae American Psychiatric Associa-
tion at 8; Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981)); see also JOHN PARRY, CRIMINAL MENTAL
HEALTH AND DISABILITY LAW, EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY 367 (2009) (noting that "[clourts
rarely, if ever, exclude [dangerousness] testimony based on legitimate questions about its
relevance or reliability.").
94 Douglas Mossman, Assessing Predictions of Violence: Being Accurate about Accuracy, 62 J.
CONSULnNG & CLINCAL PSYCHOL. 783, 783 (1994) [hereinafter Mossman, Being Accurate about
Accuracy].
95 A principal source for this belief was MONAHAN, CLINICAL PREDICION, supra, note 24. This
highly influential monograph famously claimed that "psychiatrists and psychologists are
accurate in no more than one out of three predictions of violent behavior over a several-year
period among institutionalized populations that had both committed violence in the past
(and thus had high base rates for it) and who were diagnosed as mentally ill." Id. Mo-
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This conclusion should have seemed perplexing, in no small part
because it runs counter to our everyday experience of having some
idea of what others will do, especially in the near future.96 Indeed, by
the late 1980s, mental health professionals had published research
suggesting they could gauge dangerousness reasonably well over the
next few days.97
B. Quantifying Assessment Accuracy
In the mid-1990s, mental health professionals introduced a new
method of quantifying prediction accuracy, which recognized that
assessing violence risk involved more than making a binary, "he-will-
or-he-won't" judgment about an individual's future behavior. 98 Ra-
ther, judgments about the likelihood of future violence fall on a less-
er-to-greater continuum with potentially adjustable thresholds-
levels of risk-at which clinicians make particular decisions (for ex-
ample, to hospitalize). This means that the accuracy of risk assess-
ment techniques should be described using receiver operating charac-
teristic (ROC) analysis.99 Since the introduction of ROC analysis as the
nahan's earlier work suggesting that clinical predictions were not accurate was cited in Ta-
rasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 344 n.10 (Cal. 1976). MONAHAN, CLINICAL
PREDICTION was cited in Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 899 n.7 (1983), and in countless sci-
entific publications used by mental health professionals.
96 John Monahan, The Prediction of Violent Behavior: Toward a Second Generation of Theory and
Policy 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 10, 11 (1984) (discussing evidence supporting potentially "val-
id short-term assessments of dangerousness").
97 Dale E. McNiel & Rene L. Binder, Predictive Validity of Judgments of Dangerousness in Emer-
gency Civil Commitment, 144 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 197, 197 (1987) ("emergency commitment
situation permits judgments of dangerousness with a relatively high degree of short-term
predictive validity"); Renhe L. Binder & Dale E. McNiel, Effects of Diagnosis and Context on
Dangerousness, 145 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 728, 729 (1988) (factors in assessing risk of inpatient
violence); see also Dale E. McNiel & Renee L. Binder, Clinical Assessment of the Risk of Violence
Among Psychiatric Inpatients, 148 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1317, 1320 (1991) (findings in this and
previous publications support clinical assessments of short-term violence risk).
98 Douglas Mossman, Further Comments on Portraying the Accuracy of Violence Predictions, 18
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 587, 587 (1994) [hereinafter Mossman, Further Comments].
99 William Gardner et al., Clinical Versus Actuarial Predictions of Violence in Patients with Mental
Illness, 64 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 602, 602-609 (1996); Marnie E. Rice & Grant
T. Harris, Violent Recidivism: Assessing Predictive Validity, 63 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. 737, 737 (1995); Mossman, Being Accurate about Accuracy, supra note 94, at 783;
Mossman, Further Comments, supra note 98, at 587.
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method for quantifying assessment accuracy, clinicians have com-
pletely revised their views about whether violence is "predictable"
and about whether they can accurately assess someone's dangerous-
ness. In the 21st century, ROC analysis has become the standard way
to describe the accuracy of violence risk assessments.100
Originally developed in the 1950s to evaluate radar applica-
tions,101 ROC methods assume that the ratio of correct detections of a
target (here, violent individuals) to "false alarms" (nonviolent per-
sons) reflects the intrinsic discrimination capacity of the detection
method and the threshold at which the "receiver" (here, a mental
health clinician) operates.102 ROC analysis teases out the intrinsic dis-
crimination capacity of a detection method from the particular
threshold or operating point used to make a yes-no decision.103 ROC
analyses often feature a ROC graph, which plots the true positive rate
(TPR, or the "hit rate") as a function of the false positive rate (FPR, or
the "false alarm rate"), and depicts how the TPR increases as the FPR
increases.104 ROC graphs thus display the performance of a detection
method across the entire range of possible decision thresholds, which
lets users quickly grasp the trade-offs between true positive results
(for example, correct identification of persons who will become vio-
lent) and true negative results (correct identification of persons who
will not).105 Unless the detection method is perfect, one can increase
detection of actually violent persons only by decreasing the identifica-
100 See Linda Drazga Maxfield, Measuring Recidivism Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 17
FED. SENT'G REP. 166, 169 (February 2005) (quantifying accuracy of prediction model for
criminal recidivism using ROC analysis); ROC graphs are used to describe prediction or de-
tection accuracy in a host of circumstances. Id. at 168; see also Lewis 0. Harvey, Jr. et al., Ap-
plication of Signal Detection Theory to Weather Forecasting Behavior, 120 MONTHLY WEATHER
REV. 863, 865-66 (1992).
101 See W. W. Peterson et al., The Theory of Signal Detectability, 4 TRANSACrONS IRE PROF'L GRP.
ON INFO. THEORY 171, 183 (1954).
102 Douglas Mossman & Eugene Somoza, ROC Curves, Test Accuracy, and the Description of Di-
agnostic Tests, 3 J. NEUROPSYCHIATRY CLIN. NEUROSCIENCE 330, 330-32 (1991).
103 Id. at 330-31.
104 Id. at 330.
105 See id. Though ROC graphs usually plot TPR as a function of FPR-rather than the true neg-
ative rate (TNR)-one can easily interconvert FPR and TNR using the relationship
TNR = 1 - FPR. See Mossman, Further Comments, supra note 98, at 589.
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tion of nonviolent subjects.
The area under the ROC curve (AUC) provides an intuitively
useful, single-number summary of a detection system's overall accu-
racy. Where predicting violence is concerned, AUC equals the prob-
ability that an assessment method will identify a randomly selected
violent individual as more likely to be violent than a randomly se-
lected nonviolent person.106 A perfect assessment method would
have an AUC of 1.0 (implying a 100% probability of correctly sorting
violent and nonviolent persons); an assessment method that is no bet-
ter than a coin toss (i.e., that gives no information) would have an
AUC of 0.5.107 A recent meta-analysis 08 shows that commonly used
ARAls have AUCS of approximately 0.7-0.8.109
ROC methods have led scholars and researchers to conclusions
about psychiatrists' and psychologists' ability to assess dangerous-
ness that differ sharply from what mental health professionals be-
lieved in the 1970s and 1980s. Huge numbers of publications now
confirm that mental health professionals can meaningfully rank po-
tential for future violence over periods of hours, days, months, or
106 See generally, James A. Hanley & Barbara J. McNeil, The Meaning and Use of the Area under a
Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) Curve, 143 RADIOLOGY 26, 30 (1982) (explaining
AUC).
107 Id. at 31.
108 Meta-analysis refers to a statistical method of summarizing, integrating, and interpreting
the results of several research studies. See MARK W. LIPSEY & DAVID B. WILSON, PRACTICAL
META-ANALYSIS 1-11 (2001) (noting that "meta-analysis is now widely accepted as a method
of summarizing the results of empirical studies within the behavioral, social, and health sci-
ences.").
109 Grant T. Harris & Marnie E. Rice, Actuarial Assessment of Risk among Sex Offenders, 989
ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SC. 198, 207 (2003) ("The use of actuarial methods for the prediction of
violent recidivism among sex offenders routinely achieves ROC areas in the range from 0.74
to 0.79."). Actuarial methods have produced similar findings for violence in other contexts.
See, e.g., Kevin S. Douglas et al., Assessing Risk for Violence Among Psychiatric Patients: The
HCR-20 Violence Risk Assessment Scheme and the Psychopathy Checklist: Screening Version, 67 J.
CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 917 (1999) (hereinafter Douglas et al., Assessing Risk for
Violence]; KEVIN S. DOUGLAS ET AL., HCR-20 VIOLENCE RISK ASSESSMENT SCHEME: OVERVIEW
AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY, at 8-14, (2008), available at
http://kdouglas.files.wordpress.com/2006/04/annotatel0-24nov2008.pdf (last visited De-
cember 12, 2010) (tables listing ROC areas found in several studies); Min Yang et al., The Ef-
ficacy of Violence Prediction: A Meta-Analytic Comparison of Nine Risk Assessment Tools, 136
PSYCHOL. BULL. 740, 755 (2010) (ROC areas for VRAG and HCR-20 are about 0.7).
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years.110
C. "Actuarial" Methods Supplant "Clinical" Judgment
Recent publications on violence prediction contrast two broad
types of assessment methods: those that reflect purely "clinical judg-
ment," and those that rely on mechanical, statistical, or (most com-
monly, in current mental health parlance) "actuarial" methods. In
risk assessments based on clinical judgment alone, mental health pro-
fessionals use information from interviews and history-taking that is
similar to the kinds of information they obtain when doing outpatient
medicine or psychotherapy. Among the information gathered might
be the evaluee's present mental status and life history. Other sources
of information - family, friends, and court records - might also be
consulted, along with available test results and whatever else is
available and seems relevant. Once gathered, professionals combine
the information mentally ("in their heads"), using their background
and experience to make inferences about likelihood of violence."
110 The change began with a reanalysis of published data. See Mossman, Being Accurate about
Accuracy, supra note 94, at 787 (Table 3 shows that, contrary to what had previously been
thought, clinical predictions of violence typically have clearly-above-chance accuracy).
Closely following this were studies of newly gathered data evaluated with ROC methods.
See e.g., Gardner et al., supra note 99; Rice & Harris, supra note 99; Douglas et al., Assessing
Risk for Violence, supra note 109. Over the next few years, several reports confirmed mental
health professionals' abilities to sort individuals into groups with higher and lower prob-
abilities of acting violently. Alec Buchanan & Morven Leese, Detention of People with Danger-
ous Severe Personality Disorders: A Systematic Review, 358 LANCET 1955, 1958 (2001); John Mo-
nahan, The Scientific Status of Research on Clinical and Actuarial Predictions of Violence, in
MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 300 (D. L. Faig-
man et al. eds.,) 90 (2002); Douglas Mossman, Assessing the Risk of Violence - Are "Accurate"
Predictions Useful? 28 J. AMER. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 272 (2000); Mamie E. Rice et al., The
Appraisal of Violence Risk, 15 CURRENT OPINION IN PSYCHIATRY 589 (2002). Evidence on men-
tal health professionals' ability to rank individuals' dangerousness continues to accumulate.
See, e.g., R. Karl Hanson & Kelly E. Morton-Bourgon, The Accuracy of Recidivism Risk Assess-
ments for Sexual Offenders: A Meta-analysis, PUB. SAFETY CAN. (January 2007), accessed De-
cember 12, 2010 from http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/res/cor/rep/cprmindex-eng.aspx
(meta-analysis summarizing accuracy for detection methods for sex offender recidivism);
Alec Buchanan, Risk of Violence by Psychiatric Patients: Beyond the "Actuarial Versus Clinical"
Assessment Debate, 59 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 184, 184-85 (2008) (describing studies since
2000; AUCs of 0.61 to 0.82); Yang et al., supra note 109, at 740.
111 Dawes et al., supra note 11, at 1668; William M. Grove & Paul E. Meehl, Comparative Effi-
ciency of Informal (Subjective, Impressionistic) and Formal (Mechanical, Algorithmic) Prediction
Procedures: The Clinical-Statistical Controversy, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 293, 293 (1996);
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By contrast, actuarial methods feature algorithms, formulae, or
some other explicit, mechanical combination of information for classi-
fication purposes.112 A probability assessment is derived from em-
pirically established relationships between risk factors and outcome
of interest.113 To conduct actuarial risk assessments of violence risk,
mental health professionals would look for information about pre-
specified items concerning their evaluees; then, they plug this infor-
mation into a formula or other predetermined scoring system.114 The
result would be a numerical value or category that summarizes the
evaluee's violence risk."15
When it comes to complex phenomena like human aggression,
one might think that unfettered clinical judgment -which lets profes-
sionals use all relevant aspects of their accumulated knowledge and
wisdom - would provide better predictions than could simple formu-
lae. Just the opposite is usually the case, however. Empirically based,
statistical prediction algorithms probably provide more accurate as-
sessments of dangerousness than does the unaided clinical judgment
of mental health professionals. 116 In support of this position are nu-
merous studies of various prediction tasks comparing actuarial tech-
niques with predictions by unaided clinicians,117 which show that the
former were more accurate than the latter. The reason is that predict-
ing is not a pattern-recognition task (e.g., recognizing faces), at which
William M. Grove et al., Clinical Versus Mechanical Prediction: A Meta-Analysis, 12
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT 19 (2000).
112 See Grove & Meehl, supra note 111, at 293.
113 This classic description appears in PAUL MEEHL, CLINICAL VERSUS STATISTICAL PREDICTION 3
(1954).
114 See e.g., infra Section III-D.
115 See e.g., infra Section III-D.
116 See Eric S. Janus & Robert A. Prentky, Forensic Use ofActuarial Risk Assessment with Sex Of-
fenders: Accuracy, Admissibility and Accountability, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1443, 1455-58 (2003)
(summarizing studies); John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting Harm
Among Prisoners, Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391, 408-27 (2006) (summarizing
common, valid actuarial predictive factors).
117 See e.g., Janus & Prentky, supra note 116; Monahan supra note 116. The emphasis in this par-
agraph is on "unaided" or "unfettered" clinical judgment, that is, judgment based solely on
the evaluator's mental combination of the data. Contrasted with this the assessment of dan-
gerousness using "structured clinical judgment" (or "structured professional judgment"),
discussed further below.
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human brains do well, but an extended calculation task that is
straightforward yet hard to do mentally (e.g., totaling a grocery store
bill).118 People, including clinicians, are overconfident in their own
predictive capabilities, and human beings' ability to consistently use
and manipulate arithmetic information is limited.119
Actuarial predictions may have other advantages over clinical
judgment that are morally and perhaps legally relevant. Properly im-
plemented actuarial judgment is systematic and consistent from case
to case, and it uses only variables or factors that have a demonstrable
relationship to violence. Actuarial judgments are explicit, replicable,
and transparent; they start with particular types of data and use ex-
plicit, pre-specified approaches to combine and make inferences, so
that the results of actuarial judgments are "open to inspection, ques-
tioning, and when necessary, critique." 120
Recent psychological research on violence focuses on identifying
risk factors that are statistically associated with violence and on de-
veloping instruments that use these factors to evaluate potential for
violence.121 The intent is that clinicians will use these scales to im-
plement either an actuarial judgment about likelihood of future vio-
lence or a "structured professional judgment" of risk.122 In structured
professional judgment, a clinician uses ARAI-based information as an
118 Dawes et al., supra note 11, at 1671-72.
119 Michael A. Bishop & J. D. Trout, 50 Years of Successful Predictive Modeling Should Be Enough:
Lessonsfor the Philosophy ofScience, 69 PHIL. SC. s197, s200-02 (2002); William M. Grove et al.,
Clinical Versus Mechanical Prediction: A Meta-Analysis, 12 PSYCHOL. ASSESSMENT 19, 25 (2000);
Grove & Meehl, supra note 111, at 316 (1996) ("The human brain is a relatively inefficient
device for noticing, selecting, categorizing, recording, retaining, retrieving, and manipulat-
ing information for inferential purposes.").
120 Mossman, Understanding, supra note 66, at 577. Professor Slobogin recognized this in the
1980s. See Christopher Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 97, 122-23.
He later comments, "Arguably, actuarial prediction promotes greater fairness than clinical
prediction because it explicitly recognizes the variables relied upon, whereas clinical predic-
tion allows the conscious or unconscious submergence of untidy evaluative factors." Id. at
151 n.188.
121 Dozens of such instruments are now available. See generally HANDBOOK OF VIOLENCE RISK
ASSESSMENT (Randy K. Otto & Kevin S. Douglas eds., 2010) (describing dozens of instru-
ments).
122 See, e.g., Kevin S. Douglas et al., Evaluation ofa Model of Violence Risk Assessment Among Fo-
rensic Psychiatric Patients, 54 PSYCHIATRIC SERV. 1372, 1372 (2003).
392 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y
HeinOnline  -- 11 Hous. J. Health L. & Pol'y 392 2011
RISKY BUSINESS VERSUS OVERT ACTS 393
anchor for assessing risk; then -in contrast to a purely actuarial ap-
proach- the clinician reaches an ultimate risk judgment that incorpo-
rates other information with known relevance to risk that is not in-
cluded in the ARAI.123 Whether they are used only as actuarial
measures or as a step in structuring judgment, ARAls include fea-
tures of an individual's personal background, criminal history, other
past behavior patterns, current mental condition, and future circum-
stances.124 Numerous published studies show that ARAls do a re-
spectable job of ranking individuals' relative likelihoods of acting
violently.125
D. ARAls Potentially Relevant to Civil Commitment
1. Absence of Established Instruments
Although examiners who conduct many types of forensic as-
sessments may avail themselves of instruments designed for specific
evaluation tasks, 126 no instrument has received formal promulgation
as an aid to judging the need for commitment.127 As we noted in Part
123 Id. at 1372-73 (contrasting actuarial and structured professional judgment).
124 Id. at 1374 (see Table 1).
125 As of late 2010, the most recent such study was Yang et al., supra note 109, at 741. Whether
structured clinical judgment is superior or inferior to purely actuarial judgment is contro-
versial, but the majority of authors in this area endorse structured clinical judgment. For a
short, informative discussion, see Anthony Maden, Violence Risk Assessment: The Question Is
Not lhether But How, 29 PSYCHIATRIC BULL. 121, 121 (2005) ("[Elvidence on this question,
from both forensic and general psychiatry, is unequivocal; the best assessment of violence
risk in an individual patient is provided by structured clinical judgment."). For a more ex-
tensive discussion, see Michael A. Norko & Madelon V. Baranoski, The Prediction of Violence;
Detection of Dangerousness, 8 BRIEF TREATMENT & CRISIS INTERVENTIoN 73, 73, 80 (2008) (not-
ing that "[a]ctuarial predictions of future violence based on static nonpsychiatric character-
istics achieve greater statistical accuracy than purely clinical methods" but cautioning about
the persisting, "substantial limitations of the science").
126 For example, several forensic assessment instruments (FAls) can be used in evaluations of
adjudicative competence. See Douglas Mossman et al., AAPL Practice Guideline for the Foren-
sic Psychiatric Evaluation of Competence to Stand Trial, 35 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. S3, S39-
S43(2007) (describing the Georgia Court Competency Test and MacArthur criminal adjudi-
cation instrument, among others). FAI results are not dispositive of psycholegal matters, but
using FAIs aids in systematic assessment and lets evaluators compare an individual's re-
sults to results from a normative population. RONALD ROESCH ET AL., FORENSIC PSYCHOL. &
L. 51-52 (2009) (stating that FAls "assist the evaluator in coming to an opinion").
127 Several factors may explain this absence: (1) differences in legal standards across U.S. juris-
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I, several authors have suggested that forensic assessment tools
might be appropriate for civil commitment assessments.128 Here, we
describe three already-existing measures that are potential sources of
evidence in civil commitment hearings.
2. Classification of Violence RiskTm (COVRTM)129
The creators of the COVRTm hoped their commercial software
would help practitioners apply major findings from the MacArthur
studies130 to assess risk of community violence in psychiatric patients.
The software uses a "classification tree method" to guide an evalua-
tor through a short review of patient records and a 10-minute inter-
view that emphasizes useful risk factors in the original MacArthur
subject population.131 The output of the COVRTM is a percentage-and-
dictions, which makes it hard to develop an instrument that can be used nation-wide; (2) the
chief assessment task in civil commitment evaluations concerns diagnosis and proper
treatment of mental illness, which is a general clinical skill rather than a specialized type of
assessment; (3) testimony from treating clinicians concerning the respondent's mental con-
dition usually suffices for the decisions a trial court makes in civil commitment hearings; (4)
most civil commitment hearings are short and perfunctory, which means that clinicians
have little incentive to develop more rigorous evaluation methods; (5) in most jurisdictions
(as Part IV-B shows), the trial court looks to the respondent's current condition and past
"overt acts" -not features of the respondent that contribute to probabilities of future acts,
which is what psychological tests and FAls typically measure.
128 See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
129 John Monahan et al., An Actuarial Model of Violence Risk Assessment for Persons with Mental
Disorders, 56 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 810, 815 (2005). The MacArthur studies on violence risk
assessment originally examined the predictive impact of more than 100 potential risk factors
for violence. They did this by following approximately 1,100 former psychiatric inpatients
in the community for several months after their discharges from the hospital. Investigators
gathered information about whether the patients acted violently by interviewing patients
themselves, interviewing relatives or other "collateral" sources, and examining arrest re-
cords and records of subsequent hospitalizations. The project's methods are described in de-
tail in JOHN MONAHAN ET AL., RETHINKING RISK ASSESSMENT: THE MACARTHUR STUDY OF
MENTAL DISORDER AND VIOLENCE 145-62 (2001).
130 "The MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment Study had two core goals: to do the best science'
on violence risk assessment possible, and to produce an actuarial violence risk assessment
'tool' that clinicians in today's world of managed mental health services could actually use."
THE MACARTHUR VIOLENCE RISK ASSESSMENT STUDY,
http://www.macarthur.virginia.edu/risk.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2011).
131 In contrast to traditional regression methods (which apply the same question pattern, risk
factors, factor weights, and decision algorithms to all individuals), the classification tree di-
rects gathering and prioritizing of information based on the evaluee's previous answers.
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confidence-interval estimate for the probability of violence over the
next several months.132 Note that this is a longer follow-up period
than is often the focus of civil commitment hearings, which in most
jurisdictions are not concerned with violent behavior that might oc-
cur several months in the future. Over time, however, future research
on the COVRTM may clarify its potential utility in civil commitment
cases.
3. HCR-20
As its name suggests, the HCR-20133 is a three-part, twenty-item
FAI focusing on an evaluee's personal history (ten items), current
clinical status (five items), and risk management (five items). Each
item has research-based support concerning its association with fu-
ture violence.134 Unlike the COVRTM, the HCR-20 generates no nu-
merical probability of violence. Rather, the HCR-20 should function
as "an aide-mimoire," helping evaluators to gather data about well-
known risk factors. 135 Having begun with the HCR-20 items, evalua-
This approach allows consideration of many potential combinations and weightings of risk
factors. John Monahan et al., Developing a Clinically Useful Actuarial Tool for Assessing Violence
Risk, 176 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 312, 312 (2000).
132 These estimates and their implied accuracy may be unrealistic because the authors tested
bootstrap samples from the full study population on just the classification tree developed
from the full study population. The proper cross-validation approach would have involved
drawing bootstrap samples from the full population, constructing classification trees for
each bootstrap sample, then testing the classification accuracy of these multiple trees in the
full population. The authors' approach yielded an AUC of 0.81 for the COVRTM, which
probably is overly optimistic, and risk percentages probably are extreme (the percentages
for high-risk groups are too high; the percentages for low-risk groups are too low). Results
from a follow-up study yielded findings that indicated over-optimism. See John Monahan et
al., An Actuarial Model of Violence Risk Assessment for Persons with Mental Disorders, 56
PSYCHIATRIC SERVS., 810, 814-15 (2005) (attributing this to "the shrinkage that can be ex-
pected whenever an actuarial instrument moves from construction to validation samples").
A recent study showed the COVRTM had some utility (AUC = 0.73) in assessing risk of fu-
ture violence among forensic patients in the United Kingdom. Robert J. Snowden et al., As-
sessing Risk of Future Violence Among Forensic Psychiatric Inpatients with the Classification of
Violence Risk (COVR), 60 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 1522,1524 (2009).
133 C.D. WEBSTER ET AL., HCR-20: ASSESSING THE RISK FOR VIOLENCE (VERSION 2) (1997).
134 Laura S. Guy & Catherine M. Wilson, Empirical Support for the HCR-20: A Critical Analysis of
the Violence Literature, KEVIN S. DOUGLAS, http://kdouglas.files.
wordpress.com/2006/04/hcr-20-report-2007.pdf, at 2 (last visited October 31, 2010).
135 WEBSTER ET AL., supra note 133, at 5.
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tors then consider other factors -such as availability of potential vic-
tims, treatment factors, or recent threats-to make their ultimate
judgment ("low," "medium," or "high") about an evaluee's potential
for violence.
One of the first tests of the HCR-20136 used information about in-
voluntary psychiatric inpatients followed for two years (on average)
after hospitalization. The HCR-20 did well at identifying the former
patients who had violent incidents after discharge (AUC = 0.76) and
at identifying those who committed violent crimes (AUC = 0.80).137
Subsequent studies from other countries and clinical contexts have
consistently found that the HCR-20 assigns higher scores to violent
individuals than nonviolent individuals.138
Using the full HCR-20 often requires more than two hours for
clinical data gathering, including detailed background information
for scoring "psychopathy" (one of the historical items). The items that
make up the clinical subscale 39 can often be assessed quickly, how-
ever, and these have some value in detecting potential for violence in
the hospital.140 Good information about potential for institutional vio-
lence often comes directly from clinical symptoms,141 which are al-
ways directly assessed in a standard psychiatric evaluation for civil
commitment.
136 Kevin S. Douglas et al., Assessing Risk for Violence Among Psychiatric Patients: The HCR-20
Risk Assessment Scheme and the Psychopathy Checklist: Screening Version, 67 J. CONSULTING &
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 917, 919-20 (1999).
137 Id. at 924.
138 KEVIN S. DOUGLAS ET AL., HCR-20 VIOLENCE RISK ASSESSMENT SCHEME: OVERVIEW AND
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY, at 8-9 (November 24, 2008), available at http://kdouglas.files.
wordpress.com/2006/04/annotatel0-24nov2008.pdf, (showing numerous studies yielded
AUCs values of 0.7-0.8).
139 These are insight, attitudes toward treatment, presence of symptoms, impulsiveness, and
treatment response. See C.D. WEBSTER ET AL., supra note 133, at 49-60.
140 Dale E. McNiel et al., Utility of Decision Support Tools for Assessing Acute Risk of Violence, 71 J.
CONSULTING CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 945, 951 (2003).
141 Barbara E. McDermott et al., The Accuracy of Risk Assessment Instruments in the Prediction of
Impulsive Versus Predatory Aggression, 26 BEHAV. SC. & L. 759, 775 (2008).
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4. Breset Violence Checklist (BVC)
Developed to help staff members assess risk of violence by psy-
chiatric inpatients during the initial phase of hospitalization, 142 the
Broset Violence Checklist 43 requires clinicians to indicate whether six
outwardly observable traits or behaviors1 44 are present or absent. The
more items scored "present," the higher the patient's level of violence
risk.145 An initial evaluation of the BVC showed that each item was
individually correlated with inpatient violence; inter-rater reliability
was good, and the AUC was 0.82±0.04.146 Another study showed that
a low score could correctly identify almost all nonviolent patients,14 7
and a third study involving elderly patients produced a very high
AUC of 0.940±0.015.148
E. Comments
The previously summarized information about three ARAls sug-
gests that actuarial methods provide relevant information about fu-
ture violence. Yet ARAls have evidentiary and scientific limitations
that make their use in civil commitment hearings less than automatic.
As we have just seen, the predictive capabilities of HCR-20 and
COVR have been evaluated chiefly in patients who underwent treat-
ment and were discharged to the community, and the BVC is used
for and has been tested only in inpatients. The concern in civil com-
142 This focus on violence soon after psychiatric admission may make the BVC especially rele-
vant to persons subject to potential commitment.
143 See generally, Roger Almvik & Phil Woods, Predicting Inpatient Violence Using the Breset Vio-
lence Checklist (8 VC), 4 INT'L J. PSYCHIATRIC NURSING RES. 498 (1999).
144 Viz., being confused, irritable, boisterous, physically threatening, verbally threatening, and
attacking objects. See Roger Almvik et al., The Breset Violence Checklist (BVC): Sensitivity,
Specificity and Inter-rater Reliability, 12 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1284, 1286 (2000). Note
that the last three BVC risk items are overt acts that, by themselves, might justify civil com-
mitment.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 1289-91.
147 A. Bjorkdahl et al., Nurses' Short-term Prediction of Violence in Acute Psychiatric Intensive Care,
113 ACTA PSYCHIATRICA SCANDINAVICA 224, 227 (2006).
148 R. Almvik et al., Assessing Risk for Imminent Violence in the Elderly: the Breset Violence Check-
list, 22 INT'L. J. GERIATRIC PSYCHIATRY 862, 865 (2007).
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mitment hearings, however, is what risk an untreated respondent
would pose if he were immediately released from custody.
A more important limitation stems from the fact that probabilis-
tic quantifications of future risk are useful only if one can state the
probability threshold that should trigger a decision. Yet evidence
from studies on this matter suggests that no one-judges, mental
health professionals, and other populations -agrees on what prob-
ability of future violence justifies involuntary hospitalization.149 In a
study conducted by Silver and Monahan, some judges said a 1 per-
cent risk of violence sufficed, while others would require that the risk
of violence be at least 3 out of 4.150 Two studies that examined atti-
tudes of students151 and mental health professionalS152 on balancing
false positive and false negative errorS153 found that subjects' views
differed by five orders of magnitude.
A final limitation is that the available instruments assess only the
risk of violence toward other persons.IM Yet other types of risk-viz.,
for suicide and grave disability -appear in all jurisdictions' civil
commitment statutes.155
Though these scientific problems pose major problems in decid-
ing how to apply findings from ARAls to civil commitment deci-
sions, they are not the only barriers to ARAI use. As we have sug-
149 See generally John Monahan & Eric Silver, Judicial Decision Thresholds for Violence Risk Man-
agement, 2 INT'L J. FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH 1 (2003).
150 Id. at 4. For Professor Monahan's different interpretation of these results, see John Monahan,
The MacArthur Studies of Violence Risk, 12 CRIM. BEHAV. & MENTAL HEALTH, S67, S71 (2002)
(focusing on the average result but ignoring the divergence of opinions).
151 Douglas Mossman & Kathleen J. Hart, How Bad Is Civil Commitment? A Study of Attitudes
Toward Violence and Involuntary Hospitalization, 21 BuLL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 181,
182-90 (1993).
152 Douglas Mossman, Critique of Pure Risk Assessment or, Kant Meets Tarasoff, 75 U. CIN. L. REV.
523,574-76 (2006).
153 Id. at 574. In this context, a "false positive" is a prediction (or decision based upon a belief)
that an actually nonviolent person will be violent, and a "false negative" is a prediction (or a
decision based upon a belief) that an actually violent person will not be violent. Id. One of
the earliest uses of such terminology in this context is Henry J. Steadman, The Right Not to Be
a False Positive: Problems in the Application of the Dangerousness Standard, 52 PSYCHIATRIC Q.
84,85-86 (1980).
154 See, e.g., Monahan, supra note 150, at S70.
155 See, e.g., infra p.55 (Arkansas statute).
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gested above, the actual behavioral requirements of many involun-
tary hospitalization statutes may render probabilities of future behav-
ior irrelevant. Part IV examines this matter more closely.
IV. WOULD ARAI-BASED EVIDENCE SUFFICE?
Hearings pursuant to statutes permitting post-imprisonment
commitment of "sexually violent predators" (SVPs) have generated
hundreds of published decisions that mention actuarial risk assess-
ment instruments. 156 Although SVP statutes apply only to individuals
who have been found guilty of past criminal acts, these statutes ex-
pressly direct courts to decide whether the respondent is "likely to
engage in acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility for
long-term control, care, and treatment."157 Such language makes
probabilities of future actions the explicit focus of a court's concern,
and ARAI-based information may represent the best "science" that
mental health experts can offer to courts charged with making SVP
commitment decisions.158
156 A January 4, 2011 search of the LEXIS "Federal and State Cases, Combined" Database
yielded 1,076 cases that cite one or more of the Static-99, RRASOR, or MnSOST-R, three in-
struments often used in sex offender hearings. See, e.g., GARY B. MELTON ET AL.,
PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH
PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 314 (3d ed. 2007) (discussing these instruments).
157 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-E:2(XII)(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
394.912(10)(b) (West 2002) (exhibiting same language as New Hampshire statute); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 30:4-27.26(b) (West 2010) (exhibiting same language as New Hampshire statute); see
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(a)(1) (West 2010) ("likely that he or she will engage in sexu-
ally violent criminal behavior").
158 Janus & Prentky, supra note 116, at 1449. Certain features of such instruments-particularly
their numerical estimates of risk -are controversial among mental health professionals. See,
e.g., Terence W. Campbell & Gregory DeClue, Maximizing Predictive Accuracy in Sexually Vio-
lent Predator Evaluations, 2 OPEN ACCESS J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. 148, 148-49 (2010), available at
http://web.me.com/gregdeclue/Site/Volume_2_2010_files/Campbell2%202010.pdf
(making recommendations about developing numerical estimates); Scott I. Vrieze & Wil-
liam M. Grove, Predicting Sex Offender Recidivism. I. Correctingfor Item Overselection and Accu-
racy Overestimation in Scale Development. 11. Sampling Error-Induced Attenuation of Predictive
Validity Over Base Rate Information, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 266, 266 (2008) ("the user of an
instrument similar in performance to the MnSOST-R cannot expect to achieve [a better] cor-
rect fraction... [estimate than what one would learn from] ... the population recidivism
rate alone"). As a result, some Frye jurisdictions have rejected testimony based on ARAls.
See, e.g., Collier v. State, 857 So.2d 943, 946 ("Clearly, the State failed to establish SVR-20's
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If criminal courts consider ARAI-based testimony to gauge risk
in SVP commitments, might courts hearing traditional mental health
commitment cases now be willing to do so, too? Our search for an
answer took two forms.
A. Searching Decisions
We first searched the LEXIS "Federal & State Cases, Combined"
database to see whether any court had expressly ruled that ARAI-
based findings might, on their own, justify an order for involuntary
psychiatric hospitalization.159 We also searched the same database us-
ing a strategy that sought non-SVP commitment cases that mentioned
actuarial methods.160 As of November 16, 2010, this search returned
104 published decisions. Few of these concerned civil commitments
of persons not previously involved in related criminal proceedings,16
general acceptance in the relevant scientific community by a preponderance of the evi-
dence."); People v. Taylor, 782 N.E.2d 920, 931 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) ("Lacking a threshold
showing of any indicia of validity, these instruments should not be presented to the jury as
'science.'"), abrogated by In re Commitment of Simons, 821 N.E.2d 1184 (Ill. 2004), and ap-
peal denied, judgment vacated, 824 N.E.2d 277 (Ill. 2005), and vacated, 830 N.E.2d 855 (Ill.
Ct. App. 2005). Interestingly, some Frye jurisdictions have held that the use of actuarial as-
sessments in sexually violent predator commitment proceedings is not novel scientific evi-
dence subject to the Frye test. See, e.g., In re Detention of Thorell, 72 P.3d 708, 725 (Wash.
2003); State ex rel. Romley v. Fields, 35 P.3d 82, 89 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001); In re Detention of
Erbe, 800 N.E.2d 137, 149 (Ill. Ct. App. 2003).
159 We initially searched "CLASSIFICATION OF VIOLENCE RISK" OR "COVR" OR "HCR-20" OR ((BR! OR
BROSET) PRE/1 "VIOLENCE CHECKLIST"), which returned 40 cases mentioning the HCR-20.
Most of these concerned parole or SVP commitment decisions. To exclude these, we modi-
fied the strategy to ("CLASSIFICATION OF VIOLENCE RISK" OR "COVR" OR "HCR-20" OR ((BR! OR
BROSET) PRE/1 "VIOLENCE CHECKLIST")) AND NOT (PAROLE OR "SEXUALLY VIOLENT" OR
"SEXUALLY DANGEROUS" OR "SEXUAL PREDATOR"). As of November 16, 2010, this strategy
yielded four cases, of which two - Makas and Ecker, discussed below-concerned civil com-
mitment.
160 The Boolean language for this search strategy was ((INVOLUNT! PRE/2 HOSPITA!) OR "CIVIL
COMMITMENT" OR (INVOLUNT! PRE/2 COMMIT!) OR "MENTAL HEALTH COMMITMENT" OR (PSYCH!
COMMITMENT)) AND (ACTUARIAL OR "RISK ASSESSMENT") AND NOT ("STATIC-99" OR "SEXUALLY
VIOLENT" OR SVP OR "SEX OFFENDER").
161 That is, many of the appellants were former criminal defendants who had been found in-
competent to stand trial and unrestorable (IST-U) or not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI)
concerning their criminal charges and who were then committed to hospitals for further
care. Though the involuntary hospitalizations of such individuals technically are "civil"
matters, committing courts know about the individual's previous actions, and judgments
about their dangerousness reflect this knowledge. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 463 U.S.
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and none addressed our question directly, but seven decisions pro-
vided indications about potential use of ARAls for judging appropri-
ateness of civil commitment. The following paragraphs summarize
these cases, which provide indications of courts' views concerning
ARAls in civil commitment decisions.
1. Griffin v. Twin Valley Psychiatric Systems
The two Ohio cases of Griffin v. Twin Valley Psychiatric Systems
are a Court of Claims decision and subsequent appeal by survivors of
a former inpatient's shooting rampage and family members of per-
sons whom the former inpatient killed.162 On May 11, 1995, Jerry
Hessler's mother initiated commitment proceedings via an affida-
vit.163 That evening, the county sheriff picked up Hessler and brought
him to Central Ohio Psychiatric Hospital (COPH), where Hessler was
temporarily detained pending a hearing.164 On May 17, the county
probate court ruled that Hessler should remain at COPH under a
commitment order, and he stayed there until his discharge on July 20,
354, 364 (1983) ("The fact that a person has been found, beyond a reasonable doubt, to have
committed a criminal act certainly indicates dangerousness."); Gwen A. Levitt et al., Civil
Commitment Outcomes of Incompetent Defendants, 38 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 349, 349
(2010) (empirical study showing that in commitment hearings, IST-U persons are treated
differently from persons not previously charged with crimes). Also, commitment of IST-U
and NGRI often takes place pursuant to special legislation and remains the supervision of
the original criminal court. See e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2945.39, 2945.401 (LexisNexis
2010) (section from state's criminal procedure volume provides that individuals found IST-
U or NGRI may remain under criminal court jurisdiction subject to proceedings different
from those governing ordinary civil commitment); State v. Williams, 930 N.E.2d 770, 772
(Ohio 2010) (upholding constitutionality of sections 2945.39 and 2945.401).
162 Griffin v. Twin Valley Psychiatric Sys., 771 N.E.2d 945, 947 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 2002); Griffin v.
Twin Valley Psychiatric Sys., No. 02AP-744, 2003 WL 22999355, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 23,
2003).
163 771 N.E.2d at 947. In her filings, Hessler's mother said her son had recently assaulted her
and damaged her home, possessed multiple firearms, threatened his brother with a hand-
gun, and stalked and threatened to kill a former girlfriend and her husband. Id.
164 Id. at 947-48. COPH was subsequently renamed Twin Valley Psychiatric System. Id. Located
at 2200 West Broad Street in Columbus, Ohio, the hospital is one of Ohio's public sector re-
gional psychiatric facilities. Its current name is Twin Valley Behavioral Healthcare. See Twin
Valley Behavioral Healthcare, OHIO DEP'T OF MENTAL HEALTH,
http://www.mh.state.oh.us/what-we-do/provide/hospital-services/regional-psychiatric-
hospitals/twin-valley.shtml (last visited November 15, 2010).
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1995.165 On November 19, 1995, Hessler killed four people and
wounded and terrified others. 66 The police promptly apprehended
him, and he received a death sentence at his subsequent murder tri-
al.167 The plaintiffs in Griffin alleged that COPH had negligently
treated and discharged Hessler, but following a bench trial, the Court
of Claims found in favor of the defendant hospital.168
The plaintiffs' appeal faulted the trial court for concluding that
COPH had adequately evaluated Hessler before discharging him.16 9
The trial court had found that COPH personnel had "assessed [Hess-
ler's] risk of violence according to standards of care applicable then,
which did not rely on any formal risk assessment checklist but de-
pended upon clinical interviews with knowledge of his violent his-
tory."o70 But a plaintiffs' expert had testified that COPH "should have
performed a structured risk assessment."1 71 Experts for the defen-
dants countered that the hospital had considered known risk factors
thoroughly and that instruments for structured risk assessment did
not exist when Hessler was hospitalized.172 The appeals court found
that the trial court appropriately concluded that COPH had assessed
Hessler's risk of violence in accordance with the 1995 standards of
care.173
165 Griffin, 771 N.E.2d at 948-49.
166 Id. at 958.
167 See State v. Hessler, 734 N.E.2d 1237, 1258 (Ohio 2000). Hessler died in prison in January
2003. Alayna DeMartini, Killer Dies in Death Row Cell; Murderer of Four Suffers Heart Attack,
COLUMBus DISPATCH (OHIo), January 15, 2003, at C1.
168 Griffin, 771 N.E.2d at 958-59.
169 Griffin v. Twin Valley Psychiatric Sys., No. 02AP-744, 2003 WL 22999355, at *11 (Ohio Ct.
App. Dec. 23, 2003).
170 Griffin, 771 N.E.2d at 952.
171 Griffin, No. 02AP-744 at *12.
172 Id. at *12-*13.
173 Id. at *13.
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2. Matter of Bolles'74
Before hospitalization, Alicia Lee Bolles used a three-inch paring
knife to stab a recreation center employee - "an overt [dangerous] act
causing serious physical harm to another" 175 that the trial and appel-
late courts felt satisfied Minnesota's requirements for demonstrating
dangerousness. 176 In her appeal, however, Bolles contended that she
was no longer dangerous by the time her hearing occurred.177 How-
ever, a psychologist at her hearing had testified that Bolles's history
of failing to take her medication, the stabbing, "and other actuarial
factors" made her dangerous; this testimony, said the appeals court,
was a sufficient basis for the trial court's conclusion that Bolles re-
mained "substantially likely to engage in future acts capable of in-
flicting serious harm on another."178
3. Monaco v. Hoganl79
In this section 1983 class action lawsuit, the plaintiffs sought de-
claratory and injunctive relief against New York State mental health
clinicians and officials, challenging allegedly lengthy confinement of
individuals found incompetent to stand trial and the procedures used
in involuntary hospitalization of mentally ill persons.180 The defen-
dants moved for summary judgment on several of the plaintiffs'
causes of action, which the court ultimately granted after finding that
the "deliberate indifference" standard had not been met.181
Among other accusations, the plaintiffs had alleged that psychia-
trists said mentally ill persons were dangerous merely because the
persons needed treatment; the psychiatrists had not used "guide-
174 In re Civil Commitment of Bolles, No. A07-552, 2007 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 791 (Minn.
Ct. App. Aug. 7, 2007).
175 Id. at *2-*3.
176 Id. at *1.
177 Id. at *3.
178 Id. *8-*9.
179 Monaco v. Hogan, 576 F. Supp. 2d 335 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
180 Id. at 336-37.
181 Id. at 338, 351.
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lines" or "significant criteria related to the likelihood of causing harm
when examining allegedly mentally ill individuals for civil commit-
ment purposes . . . ."182 Of particular interest here is the court's accep-
tance of the position articulated by testifying experts for both parties,
who agreed that actuarial or structured professional judgment-but
not unaided clinical judgment -were the proper methods for assess-
ing risk.183 Evidence introduced by the plaintiffs showed that clini-
cians had used clinical judgment-a presumptively inferior
method-in making decisions related to present dangerousness.184
Yet the court noted that "[dlue process does not require a guarantee
that a physician's assessment of the likelihood of serious harm be cor-
rect," provided that the physician applies "criteria that are not sub-
stantially below the standards generally accepted in the medical
community." 85 The court stated that plaintiffs had submitted suffi-
cient evidence that, if accepted by a fact-finder, might permit the con-
clusions that psychiatrists' practice fell below generally accepted
medical standards,186 but the psychiatrists' actions did not "shock the
conscience." 187 Moreover, given other, conflicting obligations faced
by psychiatrists who make civil commitment judgments,188 the psy-
chiatrists' conduct clearly had not constituted "deliberate indiffer-
ence" to their patients, and no psychiatrist had used a declaration of
dangerousness as a pretext to commit anyone whom the psychiatrist
did not really think was dangerous.189
182 Monaco, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 342 n.14.
183 Id. at 344.
184 Id. at 348.
185 Id. at 347 (citing Rodriguez v. City of New York, 72 F.3d 1051, 1061,1063 (2d Cir. 1995)).
186 Id. at 349.
187 The court cited several cases that established this as the standard for evaluating alleged due
process violations in civil commitment matters. Monaco, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 350, (citing Benn
v. Univ. Health Sys., Inc., 371 F.3d 165, 174 (3d Cir. 2004); Norris v. Engles, 494 F.3d 634, 638
(8th Cir. 2007); James v. Grand Lake Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 161 F.3d 17 (10th Cir. 1998);
Abascal v. Hilton, 2008 WL 268366 at *18 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2008); Disability Advocates, Inc.
v. McMahon, 279 F. Supp. 2d 158, 167 (N.D.N.Y. 2003)).
188 Monaco, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 350-51 (citing Olivier v. Robert L. Yeager Mental Health Ctr., 398
F.3d 183, 189 (2d Cir. 2005) and Lombardi v. Whitman, 485 F.3d 73,82 (2007)).
189 Id. at 351.
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4. United States v. Waboll90
In late 2006, a federal district court found Mr. Wabol not guilty
only by reason of insanity (NGRI) on charges of making threatening
interstate telephone calls and committed him to the Federal Medical
Center in Butner, North Carolina pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4243(e).191
Wabol sought unconditional release from his post-NGRI commitment
on grounds that he no longer had a mental illness and posed no risk
of harming anyone.192 In denying Wabol's request, the court cited, in-
ter alia,193 a June 2008 report prepared by Butner clinicians that exam-
ined "twenty-three well-recognized risk and protective factors that
have been shown to correlate positively and negatively with future
violent behaviors." 194
However, the court's decision focuses not on a score or probabil-
ity derived from these factors, but on the presence of these factors and
what these factors' established past effects on Wabol's behavior implied
about the factors' likely future impact.195 The court cited persistence
of Wabol's delusions about "an elaborate conspiracy" against him,
his comments throughout his hearing, his previous violence and
criminal activity, his ability to resume abusing alcohol and drugs if
released, his lack of any plans for where he could live, and evidence
suggesting that he would stop taking his medication (which would
allow his illness to gain renewed intensity). 196 If released, said the
190 United States v. Wabol, No. 3:04-Cr-62-TS, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11957 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 13,
2009).
191 Id. at *2-*6 (summarizing case history).
192 Id. at *1. Following Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 77 (1992), individuals found NGRI may
be confined only if they are both longer mentally ill and pose a danger to themselves or oth-
ers. Under 18 U.S.C. § 4243(f)(2006), a federal insanity acquittee who seeks release from a
hospital must show that leaving confinement would not "create a substantial risk of bodily
injury to another person or serious damage to property of another. . . ."
193 The court also noted persistence of many signs and symptoms of mental illness. Wabol, 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11957, at *9-*10.
194 A previous decision, United States v. Wabol, No. 3:04-CR-62-TS, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92610
at *8, *10 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 21, 2006), expressly mentions the "HRC-20 [sic]."
195 Wabol, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11957 at *11.
196 Wabol, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92610 at *12-*19. Here, the court quoted a testifying expert's
statement that this was "probably the best single predictor of future violence, with risk in-
creasing with each prior episode." Id. at *14.
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court, Wabol "would experience a drastic change from the highly
controlled and supervised environment to complete independence,"
experience recurrence of the same delusions that led to the acts for
which he was found NGRI, and be able to act on those delusional be-
liefs.197 Wabol, therefore, still had "a present mental disease or de-
fect," and when not medicated, "he acts on the delusions and is un-
able to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct." 198
5. Matter of Timothy Makas v. Mid-Hudson Forensic Psychiatric
Centerl99
Although Makas addressed the continued commitment of an in-
sanity acquittee (rather than someone who never was charged crimi-
nally for acts related to his hospitalization),200 we examine this case
because New York state specifies that an appellate court's review of
an insanity acquittee's commitment must be "a de novo evidentiary
proceeding, with the findings a snapshot of the acquittee's condition at that
moment."201 The court found that Makas, though mentally ill and in
need of treatment, was no longer dangerous.202 In reaching this con-
clusion, the court noted that Makas had done nothing violent for
twelve years and (referring to an expert's testimony) had low scores
on the HCR-20 and the Hare Psychopathy Checklist-Revised. 203
197 Id. at *16-*17.
198 Id. at *21.
199 Makas v. Mid-Hudson Forensic Psychiatric Ctr., 905 N.Y.S.2d 477 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).
200 Id. (discussing distinctive features of insanity acquittees' commitments).
201 Id. at 478-79 (quoting In re Norman D., 818 N.E.2d 642 (N.Y. 2004)).
202 Id. at 480.
203 Id. See generally Robert D. Hare, Psychopathy: A Clinical and Forensic Overview, 29 PSYCHIATRIC
CLINICS N. AM. 709 (2006) (discussing psychopathy and its relationship to criminal offend-
ing); Robert D. Hare, Psychological Instruments in the Assessment of Psychopathy, in THE
INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON PSYCHOPATHIC DISORDERS AND THE LAW 41 (A. R. FELTHOUS
& H. SAB eds., 2007) (discussing Hare's checklist).
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6. Ecker v. Worcester State Hospital204
John Ecker had spent twenty years in federal facilities after being
found incompetent to stand trial on a charge of possessing a firearm
when, in September 2009, he was transferred to Worcester State Hos-
pital (WSH) in Massachusetts. 205 Ecker refused to sign in voluntarily,
so WSH clinicians initiated civil commitment proceedings. 206 District
court judge Loconto ordered Ecker's commitment, which Ecker ap-
pealed.207
According to the appellate court's account of the district court
hearing, testifying clinicians had described Ecker's paranoia and de-
lusional fixations on women and multiple calls to WSH staff mem-
bers.208 These symptoms appeared to satisfy the requirement of a cur-
rent mental disorder under Massachusetts law. 209 Moreover, his
persisting delusions and ongoing attentions to a case worker showed
that he still "posed a threat," as did Ecker's "history and risk of vio-
lent behavior" documented by historical risk factors on the HCR-20.
210 Taken together, these findings convinced Judge Loconto that Ecker
still represented "a likelihood of serious harm to the public."211 Ecker
had not engaged in any recent incident of harmful behavior, but as
the appeals court noted, Massachusetts law has "'no requirement that
a 'likelihood of serious harm' be established by evidence of a recent
overt act. Nor does the statutory definition of 'likelihood of serious
204 Ecker v. Worcester State Hosp., No. 10-0494, 2010 Mass. Super. LEXIS 222 (Mass. Super. Ct.
June 30, 2010).
205 Id. at *1-*2.
206 Id. at *2.
207 Id. at *2-*3, *17.
208 Id. at *8-*11. At the hearing, psychiatrist Debra A. Pinals testified that Ecker's behavior re-
flected an erotomanic delusional system in which Ecker interpreted irrelevant events as
"signs" that a woman really liked him. Id. at *10-*11 & n.8.; see generally STALKING:
PSYCHIATRIC PERSPECTIVES AND PRACTICAL APPROACHES 28-36 (Debra A. Pinals ed., 2007)
(discussing erotomania in the context of persistent contacting or "stalking").
209 Ecker, 2010 Mass. Super. LEXIS 222 at *17-*18.
210 Id. at *11, *12 & n.9.
211 Id. at *12.
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harm,' ... require a recent overt act.'" 212 The appeals court, therefore,
found no reason to overturn the district court's judgment.213
B. Searching Statutes
We also conducted LEXIS searches of each state's commitment
laws. We located the portions of each state's code dealing with (tradi-
tional) mental health commitments; then, we examined statutory lan-
guage to see whether the plain meaning suggested (or clearly stated)
that overt behavior was a requirement for commitment. For several
states, LEXIS provided case annotations for commitment statutes. We
examined these citations to find any cases that interpreted sections of
the commitment law dealing with evidence requirements related to
any overt behavior. When annotated cases did not adequately clarify
matters for a particular state, we searched that state's LEXIS "State
Cases, Combined" database to find cases containing phrases from the
commitment statute that referred or were in close proximity to
phrases dealing with behavioral requirements.214 We also checked to
see whether incompetence to make treatment decisions about psychi-
atric care was a requirement for commitment.
The results of our statutory searches appear in Table 1. Column 1
contains the two-letter symbol for each U.S. state and the District of
Columbia. Columns 2-4 of each row contain a citation for the state's
statute, the specific type of risk addressed by the statutory phrase,
and the statute's language concerning what evidence proves that risk.
Column 5 uses "Y" and "N" ("yes" or "no") to indicate whether in-
competence to make treatment decisions is a criterion for commit-
ment based on the specific type of risk that the statutory section ad-
dresses. Columns 6-9 use "Y" and "N" to indicate whether behavior
212 Id. at *19 (citing Commonwealth v. Rosenberg, 573 N.E.2d 949 (Mass. 1991)). Though Mas-
sachusetts law requires some behavioral evidence, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 123, §1
(West 2003), Rosenberg permits commitment based on "any activity" -not just recent activ-
ity. Rosenberg, 573 N.E.2d at 959.
213 Ecker, 2010 Mass. Super. LEXIS 222, at *20.
214 Because the commitment statutes vary in their wording, the exact search strategy for each
state differed. For states with statutes that contain the phrase "overt act," we used this to
look for instances where courts might have interpreted the phrase and confirmed or discon-
firmed the need for actual behavior.
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is required to prove the risk. Finally, Column 10 contains those cases
we located that clarified whether actual behavior was required to
prove the risk exists.
Before summarizing our findings, we acknowledge that for the
many statutes about which we found no state case law addressing the
"overt act" issue, we had to infer how courts might interpret statu-
tory language. Some states' statutes seem to provide clear indications
about this. For example, Florida's statute requires that risk of harm to
self or others be "evidenced by recent behavior causing, attempting,
or threatening such harm."215 In Georgia, proving risk to self or oth-
ers requires "recent overt acts or recent expressed threats of violence
which present a probability of physical injury . .. "216
In many cases, however, matters were less certain, particularly
where statutes addressed risk of deterioration or grave disability. For
example, in Idaho, proof of risk for deterioration requires a showing,
based on the respondent's "psychiatric history, clinical observation or
other clinical evidence, [that] if he does not receive and comply with
treatment, there is a substantial risk he will continue to physically,
emotionally or mentally deteriorate. .. ."217 Because the statute refers
to someone who will "continue to" experience deterioration, we con-
cluded that the statute implies that some deterioration has oc-
curred -something that one could know only from observing the re-
spondent's speech or actions. By contrast, proving grave disability in
Idaho involves demonstrating the respondent's "inability to provide
for any of his own basic personal needs," or his lack of insight into
needing treatment, failure to comply with treatment, and clinical evi-
dence that without treatment, he would continue to deteriorate and
fail to provide for himself.218 We interpreted this statute as not requir-
ing actual behavior because a mental health professional's clinical
knowledge of how a severe illness affects persons in general, or of
how a previous episode of illness had affected a particular respon-
dent, might suffice to justify civil commitment, even if the respondent
215 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.467(1)(a)2b (West 2009).
216 GA. CODE ANN. § 37-3-1(9.1) (1995).
217 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 66-317(11)(c) (2010).
218 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 66-317(13) (2010).
409
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in question had not yet let anything self-damaging occur.
[this section resumes after Table 1]
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substantial harm to










causes "a real and
present threat of
substantial harm
to ... others"; (ii) if
A ALA. CODE not treated, will
S22-52-10.4(a) hro "continue to suffer Y N






A ALASKA STAT.§ gravely ecasse pmnent is
47.30.735(c) disabled likely to be gravely N N
K (2010). disabled
A ALASKA STAT. 
Because of mental
A 47.30.735(c) harm to illness, respondent is
K (2010. ( others likely to cause harm N N
K (2010). to others
ALASKA STAT. Because of mental
§ 47.30.735(c) harm to self lkne , reaspondent is N N
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ARIZ. REv. STAT.
A ANN.§&36-501(6) dnet

























"[Jjudgment of a others" need
person who has a not be
mental disorder is so predicated
impaired that [he] is on recent
unable to understand dangerous
ARIZ. REV. STAT. [his] need for conduct.
A ANN. § 36-501(5) danger to treatment and as a In re Pima
(2009 & Supp. others result of (his] mental Y N County
Z 2010). disorder [his] Mental
continued behavior Health No.
can reasonably be MH 1717-1-
expected . .. to 85, 149 Ariz.
result in serious 594, 721
physical harm" P.2d 142
(Ct. App.
I I I I 1 1 _ 986).
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ARIZ. REV. STAT.
501(33)(2009 &
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probability of causing
the person to suffer




























































o e g eaa ...
"(Al condition
evidenced by
behavior in which a
ARIZ. REV. STAT. person ... is likely to
A ANN. come to serious
§ 36-501(16) iaveled physical harm or N Y
Z (2009 & Supp. serious illness
2010). because [he] is






ARK. CODE ANN. bodily self-injury or
A § 20-47- danger to has attempted
207(c)(1) (AHB) self suicide, and there is N Y
R (Supp. 2009). a reasonable
probability that the
conduct will be recur
without admission;
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capacity to care for
his own ... welfare








I II) Tepro'*(i) The person's
understanding of the
need for treatment is
impaired to the point
that [he] is unlikely to
participate in
treatment voluntarily;
(ii) The person needs
mental health
treatment ... to
prevent a relapse or
harmful
deterioration ...
and (iii) in the last 48
months, the person's
noncompliance with





prison, or jail at least










inflicted, attempted to Ford v. U.S.,
inflict, or threatened No.
ARK. CODE ANN. to inflict serious 4:08CV0017
A § 20-47- danger to bodily harm on 6 JLH, 2010
207(c)(2) (Supp others another and there is N Y WL 936693,
R 2009). a reasonableat* ED
probability that the Ar I r 15,







HeinOnline  -- 11 Hous. J. Health L. & Pol'y 414 2011
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intensive treatment,
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confined for further
treatment . .. for an
additional period, not
to exceed 180 days
if .. [t]he person
has attempted,




















I ham.i upont vuers
People v.
Jason K.,
"When any person, 116 Cal.
as a result of mental Rprtr. 3d
CAL. WELF. & disorder, is a danger 443, 448
C INST. COEn danger to to others, or to (Cal. Ct.
§5150 (West himself or himself or herself. . . N N App. 2010),
A 2010) herself upon probable review
cause .. .be denied (Jan.




CAL. WELF. & "unable to provide for Ctaers
C INT OC gaey his or her basicChmes8INST. CODE gravelye 139 Cal.
Arn 5008(h) (West disabled fo ng, r N N Rptr. 357-
A 2010). food, clothing, or 60 (Cal. Ct.shelter"App 1977)
People v.
"When any person Taylor, 618
appears to have a P.2d 1127,
mental illness . .. 1137 (Colo.
appears to be in 1990).
COLO. REv. imminent danger to ("Idanger-
C STAT. danger to others or himself. . ousness to
§ 27-10-105 others [or] gravely disabled, N Y others may
O (1)(a)(I) (2010). then. .. the be shown by
'intervening evidence of
professional' . . . may injurious
take the person into acts,
custody" attempts, or
threats.")
"When any person People v.
appears to have a Taylor, 618
mental illness . . . P.2d 1127,
COLO. REV. appears to be in 1137 (Colo.
C STAT. danger to imminent danger to 1990).
§ 27-10-105 others or himself N Y ("Danger-
(1)(a)(1) (2010). self [or) gravely disabled, ousness to
then ... the oneself may
'intervening be shown
professional' . . . may by ...
take the person into evidence,
C
A
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harm due to his or








social relations to the




lacks the capacity to
understand this. (b) if
notice is given that
[family] support is to
be terminated and
the individual (a) has
a major mood or
thought disorder; (lI)
has been certified or
gotten inpatient
treatment at least
twice in the last 36;
and (111) is
deteriorating toward







treatment; and (IV) Is
not receiving
treatment essential








CONN. GEN. "[S~ubstantial risk
C STAT. ANN. that physical harm
§ 17a-495(a) dangerous will be inflicted by an N N
T (West Supp. to himself individual upon his or
2010). her own person"
CONN. GEN. "[SJubstantial risk
C STAT. ANN. that physical harm
§ 17a-495(a) danger to will be inflicted by an N N
T (West Supp. others individual ... upon
2010). another person"
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(ii) poses a real and
D DEL. CODE ANN. present threat, based
tit. 16 § 5001(6) harm to self upon manifest y y
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person is likely to
commit or suffer
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person's own self or
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commit or suffer
serious harm to that
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person's
hospitalization, and




person is likely to
commit or suffer
serious harm to that
person's own self or




D.C. CODE '[l]s likely to injure In re Artis,
D § 21-545(b)(2) harm to himself or others if N N 615 A.2d
C (LexisNexis others not committed" 
1148,1153
2008). (D.C. 1992).
D.C. CODE "[I]s likely to injure
D 21-545(b)(2) harm to self himself or others if N N
C 20e0xNexis not committed"
"[Cannot survive]
alone or with the help
of willing and
responsible family or
FLA. STAT. ANN. friends, including
F § 394.467(1)(a) harm to available alternative
(2)(a) well-being services, and,
L (West 2006). without treatment, is
likely to suffer from
neglect or refuse to
care for himself or
herself
FLA. STAT. ANN. . [R]ecent behavior
F § 394.467(1)(a) bodily harm causing, attempting,
(2)(b) to self or threatening such Y
L (West 2006). harm"
FLA. STAT. ANN. "[RIecent behavior
F § 394.467(1)(a) bdIy harm causing, attempting,
(2)(b) t ar or threatening such Y Y




G (§3A-3-) harm to self which present a N Y




G §37-3- harm threats of violence
G 1§ 37-3-har th which present a N Y
A (Supp. 2011). ours probability of
physical injury to
other persons"
"[S]o unable to care Ruff v. Cent.
GA. CODE ANN. for ... own physical State Hosp.,
G § 37-3- unable to health and safety as 385 S.E.2d
1(9* 1)(A)(ii) care for self to create an N N 734, 735-36
A (Supp. 2011). imminently life- (Ga. Ct.
endangering crisis" App. 1989).
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and the assistance of




care, shelter or self-











HAW. REV. STAT. substantial physical
H ANN. § 334-1 dangerous or emotional injury
(LexisNexis to others on another, as N Y
I Supp. 2009). evidenced by a
recent act, attempt or
threat"
"(1) . . . [U]nable to




HAW. REV. STAT. unable to make or
H ANN. § 334-1 gravely communicate rational














HAm. REV. STAT understanding
H ANN. § 3341 (the] . serious and
(LexisNexis obvi highly probable rsks Y Y
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IDAHOCoos[E]videnced by
IDAHOCODE physical seattempts toI ANphscl commit suicide].] or NY
D 66-317( 11)(a) harm to self inflict 
physical harm N Y
(Supp. 2010). on [self]"
"[E]videnced by
behavior which has
IDAHO CODE caused such harm or
ANN. phys a which places another
§ 66-317(11)(b) person or persons N Y




into ... need for
treatment and






IDAHO CODE clinical evidence, if
ANN. deterioration he does not
§ 66-317(l1)(c) receive ... Y






to the point [he will
soon] inflict physical
harm on himself or
another person"
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'(a) In danger of
serious physical
harm [from) inability









IDAHO CODE [cannot or will not)
I ANN gravely comply with
§ 66-317(13) disabled treatment and, based y N




he does not (get]
treatment, there is a
substantial risk [of
deteriorating and
being] in danger of
serious physical
harm due to (failure













But see In re
Torski C.,
918 N.E.2d
"[C]ourt may 1218, 1232
405 ILL. COMP. consider evidence of 
0App. Ct.
IL.Coethe person's 20)
STAT. ANN. harm to repeated past pattem appeal
L (/1 xg1s others of specific behavior N N smissted
Supp. 2006). and actions related (Sept. 15,
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consider evidence of In re
405 ILL COMP. the person's Mazzara,
STAT. ANN.
IL 5/1-119(l) harm to self repeated past pattern 
478 N.E.2d
of specific behavior N N 567, 569 (Ill.
(LexisNexis and actions related App. Ct.




405 ILL. COMP. the person's
I STAT. ANN.
senous repeated past pattern
5/-11)harm of specific behavior N N
L (LexisNexis and actions related
Supp. 2010). to the person's
illness."
"[U]nable to
understand . .. need
for treatment and ...
405 ILL. COMP. if not treated, is
I STAT. ANN. [likely] to suffer ...
5/1-119(3) deterioration mental ... or Y N
L (LexisNexis emotional




"[T]he behavior used In re
ND. CODE ANN. as an index of a CommitmentIND. CODE ANN. person'sofGre
I §127-2-3 hano to dangerousness N Y 696 N.E.2d










IND. CODE ANN. (omeren
12-7-2-53 See case citation N Y 696 NE2d
N (LexisNexis disabled 416.,4182006). (Ind. App.
1998)
IOWA CODE ANN. In re Mohr,
I § 229.1(17)(a) physically See case citation y 383 N.W.2d
(West Supp. injure self 539,542
A 2010). (Iowa 1986)
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IOWA CODE ANN. 539, 542
I § 229.1(17)(a) physically See case citation Y Y (Iowa 1986)
(West Supp. injure others (" recent






IOWA CODE ANN. emotional 344 (IowaA § 229 1(17)(b) injto See case citation y y 1998)





IOWA CODEANN. N.W.2d 340,
§ 229.1(17)(c physical 344 (Iowa
(West Supp injury or See case citation y y 1998)




KAN. STAT. ANN. Behavior threatening,
K § 59- harm to self attempting or
2946(f)(3)(a) causing such injury, Y Y
S (2005). abuse or damage
KAN. STAT. ANN. Behavior threatening,
K § 59- harm to attempting or
2946(f)(3)(a) others causing such injury, Y Y
S (2005). abuse or damage
KAN- STAT. ANN.
K § 59- harm to




KAN. STAT. ANN. person's ability to in 
re
K § 59- function"; present Albright, 836
2946(f)(3)(b) deterioration statute, however, Y N P.2d 1, 5
S (2005). does not expressly (Kan. Ct.
require a showing of App. 1992)
present danger or a
recent overt act.
"[I]ncluding actions
KY. REV. STAT. which deprive self, No case
ANN substantial family, or others of addresses
§ 202A.01 1(2) physical sue insof N N meaning of
Y (LexisNexis harm to self provision for "including"
2007). reasonable shelter, cleariy
food, or clothing"
KY. REV. STAT. substantial
K ANN h
K 202A.011(2) o N N
y (LexisNexis others
2007). others
HeinOnline  -- 11 Hous. J. Health L. & Pol'y 423 2011

















there is a substantial









LA. REV. STAT. physical support a reasonable
LA ANN. § 28.2(3) harm to expectation that N Y
(Supp. 2011). another there is a substantial
risk that he will inflict
physical harm upon
another person in the
near future."
"[Clondition of a
person who is unable





shelter, as a result of
serious mental
illness or substance
abuse and is unable
to survive safely in
freedom or protect
himself from serious In re M M.,LA. REV. STAT. harm; the term also 552 So. 2d
LA ANN. § 28:2(10) gravely includes N Y 528,528,
(Supp. 2011). incapacitation by 530(1989)alcohol, which
means the condition
of a person who, as









respect to his need
for treatment"
ME. REV. STAT. "[R]ecent threats of,
M ANN. tit. 34-B, or attempts at,
a3801(4 A)(A)' hysae suicide or serious N Y
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"[Riecent homicidal
ME. REV. STAT. or violent behavior
M ANN. tit. 34-B, physical or . . . recent conduct
§§ 3801(4-A)(B), harm to placing others in N Y




ME. REV. STAT. severe demonstrating an
M tit. 34-B, physical or inability to avoid risk
§§ 3801(4-A)(C), mental or to protect the N Y
E 3864(6)(A)(1) impairment person adequately
(2010). or injury from impairment or
injury"
MO. CODE ANN.,




M HEALTH-GEN life or safety§ 10-622(a)(2) of others (not specified) N N
D (LexisNexis
Supp. 2010)
MAss. GEN. "[E]vidence of,
M LAws ANN. physical threats of,- or
ch. 123, § 1 harm to self attempts at, suicide N Y







"[E]vidence of wealth v.
homicidal or other Rosenberg,
MASS GEN. violent behavior or 573 N.E.2d
M LAWS ANN. physical evidence that others 949 955.
ch. 123, § 1 harm to are placed in N Y 958-59
A (West 2003). others reasonable fear of (Mass.
violent behavior and 1991) (citing
serious physical United







so affected that he is
MASS. GEN. physical unable to protect
M LAWSANN. impairment himself in the
ch. 123, § 1 or injury to community and that N N
A (West 2003). self reasonable provision
for his protection is
not available in the
community."
MICH. COMP. seriously "{E]ngaged in an act
LAWS ANN. physically or acts or made
MI § 330.1401(a) injure significant threats N Y
(West Supp. another in that [support) the
2010). near future expectation"
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LAWS~ ~~ AN. Mo ct rmd
i § 330.1401 (a) . hysialY significant threats IN Y






I-Aws ANN. - needs (food, "[D]emonstrated that
MI § 330.1401(b) clothing, or inability by failing to
(West Supp. shelter) as attend to those basic N Y





impaired that he . . .
[cannot]
MicH. COMP understand ... need
LAWS ANN. significant for treatment and
MI § 330.1401(c) physical whose 
continued
(West Supp. harm to self behavior ... can 
Y Y Y




"(1) a failure to obtain
necessary food,
clothing, shelter, or




other than indigence In re Civilto obtain necessary Commitment
food, clothing, of Anderson,
MINN. STAT. ANN. shelter, or medical No. AO7
M § 253B.02(13)(a) physical care as a result of 2294,2008
(West Supp. harm to self the impairment N Y LEXIS 408,
N 2011). and. .. person will at "4, "8[ikely] suffer tsubstantial harm App. Apr.[without treatment]; 22, 2008).(3) a recent attempt
or threat to physically
harm self or others;
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MINN STAT. ANN. physical
§ 253B.02(13)(a) harm to
(West 2011). othiers
"(3) A recent attempt
or threat to physically
harm self or others,






























M § 41-21"1 physical threat amt orscll
S (e)(ii)(A) (West harm to self hra hsalo N Y
2010).
Miss- CODE ANN. physical "[R]ecent attempt or
(e)(iM)(A) (West harm to threat to physically N Y
S 2010). others harm . . . others."
MISS. CODE ANN. "[Flailure to provide
M § 41-21 - necessary food,
61(e)(ii)(B) (West disabled clothing, shelter or N Y









MISS. CODE ANN. deterioration which
M 41-21- would predictably
61(e)(ii)(B) (West deterioration result in y Y
S Supp.i201) dangerousness toSupp. 2010). himself or others
when his current
mental illness limits
or negates his ability
to make an informed
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including verbal
threats, or attempts
to commit suicide or
inflict physical harm






being inflicted by a
N Y
S K I" I' " '"' " III___I
"[An impairment in









in an inability to




medical care or his
inability to provide for
his own mental
health care which
may result in a
substantial risk of
serious physical






harm to the person
previously taking








'[R]ecent overt acts, In re
behavior or threats, O'Brien, 600
including verbal S.W.2d
threats, which have 695,697
caused such harm or (1980)
M Mo. ANN. STAT. serious which would place a 
(Evidence
M M 632 9)(c) haSA eo reasonae person in Nmust be§ 62 05(9(c hrmto reasonable fear Of N Yclear and
S (West 2006). others sustaining such convincing,
harm. Evdence ... meaning
may also include "instantly
information about tilt[s] the
patterns of behavior scales"
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harm previously
being inflicted by a
person upon another







M MONT. CODE [U]nable to provide C.M., 635
ANN., §53-21- grab for the respondent's N Y P.2d 273,
T 126(1)(a) (2009). disability own basic needs 274 (Mont.
1981).
MONT. CODE
M ANN., §53 21- harm to self [A]ct or omission N Y126(1 )(b)-(c)
T (2009).
MONT CODE
M ANN., - o [A]ct or omission N Y126(1)(b)-(c) others [itroiso
T (2009).
M MONT. CODE Demonstrated by the
ANN., §53-21- deterioration respondent's recent N Y
T 126(1)(d) (2009). acts or omissions
"[Mianifested by
evidence of recent
N NEB. REV. STAT ha violent acts or threats
§ 71-908(1) h of violence or by Y Y




N NEB. REV. STAT. evidence of recent
§ 71-908(2) harm to self attempts at, or y y
E (2009). threats of, suicide or
serious bodily harm"
"[E]vidence of
inability to provide for In re Interest
his or her basic Of
N NEB. REV. STAT. human needs, Kinnebrew,
§ 71-908(2) deterioration including food, Y 402 N.W.2d
E (2009). clothing, shelter, 264, 267-68
essential medical (Neb. 1987).
care, or personal
safety"
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unless he is admitted
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facilitv"
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acts in furtherance of
a threat to commit




unless he is admitted












unless he is admitted







on any other person,
or made threats to
NEV. REv. STAT. inflict harm and
N ANN. harm to committed acts in
§ 433A.115(3) others furtherance of those y y
V (LexisNexis threats, and if there
2009). exists a reasonable
probability that he
will do so again
unless he is admitted
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"[W]ithin 40 days ...
N.H. Rev. Stat. the person has State v.
N Ann. inflicted, attempted to Lavoie, 155
§ 135-C:27(tl) danger to inflict, or threatened N Y N.H. 477,
H (LexisNexis others to inflict serious 480-81




so lacks the capacity
ANH. Rto care for his own
Ndetenoration welfare that there is
H 135-C:27(t)(c) a likelihood of death, N
H 6 (Lxieserious bodily injury,
or serious debilitation






N N.H. probability refused treatment,ANN. p psychiatrist








N.J. STAT. ANN. mental illness the
N § 30:4-27.2(h) dangerous person has
(West Supp. to self threatened or N Y







"[D]etermination shall that sort
N.J. STAT. ANN. take into account a prior to her
N § 30:4-27.2(i) dangerous person's history, admission"
(West Su pp. to others recent behavior and N Y In re
" 2010). any recent act [or Commitment
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such a manner as to
indicate that the
person is unable to
satisfy his need for
nourishment,
essential medical
care or shelter, so








take into account a
N.J. STAT. ANN. person's history,
N § 30:4-27.2(i) dangerous recent behavior and
(West Supp. to property any recent act [or] N Y




not that in the near
future the person will
attempt to commit
N.M. STAT ANN suicide or will cause
N § 43-1-3(M) danger to serious bodily harm
(LesisNexis sell to the person's self N N
M 2010). by violent or other
self-destructive
means, including but
not limited to grave
passive neglect"
"[Miore likely than
not that in the near




N.M. STAT. ANN. person or commit a In re Pernell,
N §4--() dneto criminal sexual 590 P.2d
M 4 13(N d a n r to N Y3 , 4(LexisNexis others ofense, as   68 4
M 200) eidenced by (N.M. Ct.




rise to a reasonable
fear of such harm
from the person"
"{M]anifested by New Yr
N.Y. MENTAL threats of or attempts City Health
HYG. LAW at suicide or serious & Hals
N §§ 9.01, danger to bodily harm or other Corp., 523
9.39(a)(1) self conduct demon- N Y N.Y.S.2d 71Y (McKinney strating that the 85-86 (N.Y.
2006). person is dangerous App. Div.to himself or herself" 1987).
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[Manifested by Robinson v.N.Y. MENTAL homicidal or other Snhz
N HYG. LAW violent behavior by 
168 Misc.2d
N c 9. 01, danery which others are N Y 5 6, 553Y .(Mc(2iothey placed in reasonable (N.Y. Sup.
2006). fear of s Ct. 1996).2006). ~physical harm" C.19)
"[Aicted in such a
way as to show that





otherwise available, In re Holt,
N.C. GEN STAT to exercise self-
N ANN. § 122C d control, judgment, 283,414
3(1 1)(a)(1)(() deterioration and discretion in the y Y 413,414
(West 2010). conduct of his daily App. 1981)
responsibilities and
social relations, or to
satisfy his need for
nourishment,
personal or medical













N.C. GEN. STAT, that the individualN ANN § 122C- deterioration [cannot] control[,] ... y
3( 1)(a)(1)(11) behavior that isC (West 2010). grossly inappropriate
to the situation,












N.C. GEN. STAT, mutilated himself],] or
N ANN. § 122C- harm to self attempted to mutilate
3( 1)(a)(2)-(3) himself and ... there Y'
C (West 2010). is a reasonable
probability of [similar
harm to self] unless
adequate treatment
is given"
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OKLA.STAT.ANN."[Mianifested byOKLA. STAT. ANN. serious
O tit. 43A § 1- "harm to threats of or attempts103(13(a)(1), self" at suicide or other N Y
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days: ... (ii) the 'substantial
person has mutilation'
attempted suicide, would
mutilated himself, appear to
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P ANN. threats to commit permanent
§ 7301(b)(2)(ii)- harm to self suicide or to mutulate N Y destruction
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furtherance of such v. Coachi,
threats to commit 939 A.2d
suicide or to mutilate 349, 354
himself, and there is (Pa. Super.
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(2006). risk" to physical
438
HeinOnline  -- 11 Hous. J. Health L. & Pol'y 438 2011
RISKY BUSINESS VERSUS OVERT ACTS 439
health and safety
s S.C. CODE ANN. "Mhreats of, or
§ 44-23-10(2)(1) harm to self attempts at, suicideor serious bodily N Y
C (2002). harm"
S.C. CODE ANN"[H]omicidal or 
other
S 44-23-10(2)(2) harm to violent behavior and
§ -22 others serious harm to N Y
C (2002). them"
"[P]erson's judgment
is so affected that he
CODE ANN. physica is unable to protect
. ysical himself in the
§ 44-23-10(2)(3) impairment community and that N N
C (2002). or injury to reasonable provisionself for his protection is
not available in the
community"
"[L]acks sufficient
S.C. CODE ANN. insight or capacity to
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D (2004). essential medical
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for criminal behavior"
that stem from a
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s I-w eiu threatened or
§27A-1-1(5)(a) physical attempted suicide or N Y
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T 33-6-501(1)(A) harm to self attempted suicide or N Y
N to inflict serious(2007). bodily harm"
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N Y
TENN. CODE [P]erson is unable to
T ANN. grave avoid severe
§ 33-6-501(1)(D) disability impairment or injury N Y
N (2007). from specific risks"
In e J.J.K.,
No. 14-03-
TEX. HEALTH & "[U]nless waived, 00380-CV,
SAFETY CODE evidence of a recent 2003 WL
T ANN. §§ serious overt act or a 22996950,
X 574.034(a)(2)(A), harm to self ontinig pattern of N 
Y at 3 (Tea.
2d)(1)(West confirm likelihood of Houston
2010). serious harm." [14th Dist.]
Dec. 23,
2003).
In re F. M.,
183 S.W.3d
489, 492-93
"unless waived, (Tex. App.-
TEX. HEALTH & evdneo eetHoustonTFSHFi  evidence of a recent [14th Dist.]
SAFETY CODE overt act or a [4hDs]
T ANN. §§ harm to continuing pattem of 2005);
574.034(a)(2)(B), others behavior tendng to N Y KaeW v.6
(d)(1) (West confirm likelihood of S.W.3d 686,












TEX. HEALTH &to function G.H. v.
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574.0 ) physical to provide for basic Y y 631 (Tex.
X (i)-(i )(2) deterioration needs; cannot make App.-
2 a rational and Houston [ist




a recent overt act or
a continuing pattern
of behavior
UTAH CODE ANN. "[A]t serious risk to
U § 62A-15-602 commit suicide or
(13)(a)(i)-(ii) harm to self inflict serious bodily N Y
T (LexisNexis injury on himself or
2006). herself"
HeinOnline  -- 11 Hous. J. Health L. & Pol'y 440 2011
RISKY BUSINESS VERSUS OVERT ACTS 441
"at seriu ikt
UTAH CODE ANN. suffer serio ily
U § 6a-15-60 grave injury because he is
T ais disability incapable of N N
T (LexisNesis providing the basic
2006). necessities of life"
"at serious risk to
UTAH CODE ANN. cause or attempt to
62A-15-602cause serious bodily
Ll 6A-15-02 harm to injury.; or has
(13)(b)-(c) others inflicted or attempted N N
T (LexisNexis to inflict serious







Has inflicted or proposed
attempted to inflict patient
bodily harm on presents a
VT. STAT. ANN. another, or thru present
V lit. 18, harm to threats or actions danger of
§ 7111)A tes has placed others in N Y harm to
T (210(). A thr reasonable fear of himself or
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actions or inactions evidenced
have endangered by threats or





VT. STAT. ANN. "(nohas threatened or
V tit. 18, harm to self attempted suicide or N Y
T § 7101(17)(B)(i) serious bodily harm"
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to indicate that he
cannot, without
supervision and the
assistance of others, "[Slome
satisfy his need for behavior
nourishment, indicating
VT. STAT. ANN. personal or medical the inability
it. 18, grave crsetorel-to care for
§ 7101(17)(B)(ii) disability protection and N Y oneself is
T (00.safety, so that required." In
(00.without treatment, re L.R., 497
substantial physical A.2d 753,







V VA. CODE ANN. § ha o causing, attempting,
37.2-809(B)(i)(a) othes or threatening harm
A (Supp.2010). o and other relevant
information, if any"ica
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"[R]ecent behavior
V VA. CODE ANN. § causing, attempting,
37.2-809(B)(i)(a) harm to self or threatening harm N Y
A (Supp. 2010). and other relevant
information, if any"
'[Sluffer serious
V VA. CODE ANN. § harm due to his tack37.-80(B(i)b) grave of capacity to protect
(Supp. 2010). disability himself from harm or N N
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A routine functioning
§ 71.05020(17) gravely evidenced bydisabled repeated and N Y
A (West Supp. escalating loss of2010). cognitive or volitional
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receiving such care"
essential to health or
safety
WASH. REV. "Mhreats or
W CODE ANN. § attempts to commit
71.05.020(25)(a) harm to self suicide or inflict N Y











"We thus interpret the context
RCW 71.05.020 as ofthe
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A (a)(ii)-(b) (West recent overt act." In chapter
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2010). _ __ property of others"
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Table 1 summarizes 166 statutory provisions from the 51 U.S. ju-
risdictions, an average of 3 provisions per jurisdiction. All jurisdic-
tions' commitment laws address risk of harm to oneself and others.
We classified 44 jurisdictions' laws as addressing grave disability,
and 17 as addressing other concerns, mainly deterioration and harm
to property.
Table 2 describes the jurisdictions' rules concerning overt behav-
ior as evidence of risk. Where risk to others is concerned, thirty-nine
states appear to require actual behavior, while eleven states and the
District of Columbia do not. Concerning risk to self, thirty-eight ju-
risdictions require behavior, twelve jurisdictions do not, and West
Virginia has one statutory provision requiring actual behavior and
one statutory provision that does not require actual behavior. In most
jurisdictions, requirements for actual behavior are the same whether
the risk is to the respondent himself or to others; for easy apprehen-
sion, we have underlined abbreviations of those states where the be-
havior requirement differs in Table 2. Finally, sixteen of the forty-four
states with "grave disability" statutes appear to allow proof of this
risk without actually requiring that the respondent openly display
behavior indicative of the risk.
[this section resumes after Table 2]
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Table 2. - Requirements for overt behavioral evidence, by jurisdiction
To AR, CA, DE, FL, GA, HI, IA, ID, AK, AL, AZ, CO,CT,
others IN, KS, LA, MA, ME, MI, MO, MS, DC, IL, KY, MD,
MT, NC, NE, NH, NJ, NM NV, MN, ND, OH, RI,
NY, OK, OR, PA, SC, SD, TN, TX, UT
VA, VT, WA, WI, WV, WY
To self AR, AZ, DE, FL, GA, HI, IA, ID, IN, AK, AL, CA,
KS, LA, MA, ME, MI, MO, MS, MT, CO,CT, DC, IL, KY,
NC, NE, NH, NJ, NV, NY, OH, OK, MD, MN, ND, NM
OR, PA, SC, SD, TN, TX, VA, VT, RI, UT, WV
WA, WI, WV, WY
Grave AR, AZ, CT, FL, HI, IN, IA, LA, AK, CA, CO, GA,
disability ME, MI, MS, MO, MT, NV, NC, ID, IL, KS, MA, NC,
ND, NH, NJ, OH, OR, PA, SD, TX, OK, RI, SC, TN,
VT, WA, WI, WI, WY UT, VA, WV
Perusal of Table 1 reveals that even within a specific type of risk
(to others, to self, or grave disability), jurisdictions differ in the lan-
guage they use to identify the risk. In Table 3, we summarize this
phenomenon for risk toward others.
[this section resumes after Table 3]
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Table 3. -Statutory language concerning harm to others
VT, WV, NH, WV bodily harm
CO, NH, OR danger; dangerous
AK, IN, KS Harm
DC, MT injure others
MD life or safety
AZ, WV, CT, IL, RI, CA, ID, MA,
ME, MN, MS, SC, W1, WA, GA, physical harm or injury
IA, MT
LA physical harm in near future
HI physical or emotional injury
AR, FL, NC, NJ, PA, NV, UT, OH, serious bodily harm, serious
NY, OK, TN, VA, WY, SD, MO, physical harm, serious physical
SC, W1, MA, ME injury
ND serious bodily harm or killing
DE, MO, NE, TX serious harm
NM serious, unjustified bodily harm;
sex offense
significant physical harm;
Ml seriously physically injure in near
future
AL substantial harm
KY substantial physical harm
Looking at Table 3, one sees that what jurisdictions mean by risk
of harm to others varies considerably. The modal concern is risk of
"serious" physical harm or injury, which arguably is the same as
"substantial" physical harm (Kentucky's phrase). In several jurisdic-
tions, however, any physical harm or injury would suffice; in others,
the concern could include emotional injury (Hawaii)219 or any harm
that is "substantial" (Alabama).220 In at least six states, any harm or
219 HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 334-1 (LexisNexis Supp. 2009).
220 ALA. CODE § 22-52-10.4(a) (2006).
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danger appears sufficient. 221
This finding has implications for the use of risk assessment in-
struments in civil commitment determinations. Typically, ARAls are
normed or validated for detection of a specific type of behavior. 222 In
some jurisdictions, the fit between the definition used to validate the
ARAI and the statutory specification of risk may be close enough to
make the ARAI findings relevant to most determinations of risk to
others. But in those jurisdictions where emotional harm, "substan-
tial" harm, or any harm at all is the statute's focus, ARAls may not
provide relevant information about risk.
V. CONCLUSION
Montana is one of four states that retain "imminent danger" pro-
visions in their civil commitment statutes.223 In Montana's case, a
court may order the involuntary hospitalization of a mentally ill re-
spondent whose mental disorder creates, "an imminent threat of in-
jury to ... others .... Imminent threat of ... injury to others must be
proved by overt acts or omissions, sufficiently recent in time as to be
material and relevant as to the respondent's present condition."224 In
221 ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.735(c) (2010); COLO. REV. STAT. § 27-10-105 (1)(a) (2010); IND. CODE
ANN. § 12-7-2-53 (LexisNexis 2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2946(f)(3)(a) (2005); N.H. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 135-C:27(Il) (2010); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 426.005(1)(e)(A) (West 2009).
222 See, e.g., Henry J. Steadman et al., A Classification Tree Approach to the Development ofActuarial
Violence Risk Assessment Tools, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 83, 86 (2000) (showing studies de-
signed to validate the COVR used the following definition of violent behavior: "acts of bat-
tery that resulted in physical injury; sexual assaults; assaultive acts that involved the use of
a weapon; or threats made with a weapon in hand.").
223 MONT. CODE ANN. §53-21-126 (2005). The other states are Georgia, Hawaii, and Ohio. See
GA. CODE ANN. § 37-3-1(9.1)(A)(i) (1995) (permitting commitment of a person who poses "a
substantial risk of imminent harm ... as manifested by either recent overt acts or recent ex-
pressed threats of violence"); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 334-60.2 (LexisNexis 2008) (permit-
ting commitment of a person who "is imminently dangerous to self or others"); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 5122.01(B)(4) (LexisNexis 2008) (permitting commitment of a mentally ill per-
son whose behavior "creates a grave and imminent risk to substantial rights of others or
[himself]"). By contrast, Virginia removed its statutory "imminent danger" provision in leg-
islative changes that followed the 2007 Virginia Tech shootings. For a discussion, see Alison
Pfeffer, "Imminent Danger" Standard for Involuntary Civil Commitment in the Wake of the Vir-
ginia Tech Tragedy, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 277,277-80 (2008).
224 MONT. CODE ANN., § 53-21-126 (2005).
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In re Mental Health of A.S.B., the Montana Supreme Court explained
that for someone to pose an "imminent threat:"
The danger must be fairly immediate. .. .The law requires only
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the threat of future injury
presently exists and that the threat is imminent, that is, impend-
ing, likely to occur at any moment .... a present indication of
probable physical injury which is likely to occur at any moment
or in the immediate future . . . .225
"Imminence" or related terms do not appear in most civil com-
mitment statutes, even in those jurisdictions that make proof of overt
behavior a requirement for involuntary hospitalization. Yet the Mon-
tana Supreme Court's "present indication" language points to what
we suggest are the core concerns of statutes that require "overt acts"
as proof of risk. When people make credible threats to do harm or
engage in potentially or actually harmful behavior, they make a fea-
ture of themselves - their dangerousness - manifest. Through their
action, the danger that they represent to themselves or others be-
comes a presence in the environment, in the same way that reckless
driving is a presence for other persons on or near the road, and in the
same way that toxic waste may be a presence in the lives of persons
who live near a dumpsite. Overt behavior establishes that a risk is
present, though actual future harm remains a less-than-certain prob-
ability.
In this article, we have suggested that the probabilistic evidence
established by mental health professionals' ARAls may have, at most,
ancillary significance for civil commitment proceedings in jurisdic-
tions that require behavioral proof of danger, or as it is often termed,
an overt act. In advancing this contention, we have suggested that the
probabilistic reasoning underlying ARAls implicitly incorporates
economic connotations that increasingly influence current use of the
word "risk," under which (for example) the prospect of a bad event is
countered (or "managed") by insurance-an enterprise that requires
monetary valuation of potential event-related losses and calculations
of how probable those events are. 22 6 By contrast, the connotation of
225 In re Mental Health of A.S.B., 180 P.3d 625, 631 (Mont. 2008).
226 For an introductory description that assumes this perspective on risk, see HAROLD D.
SKIPPER & W. JEAN KwON, RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE: PERSPECnVES IN A GLOBAL
450 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y
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risk evoked by overt act requirements relates to the demonstration of
present dangers-an idea more closely related to the word's etymo-
logical origins.227
In advancing this notion, we have relied on wording of statutes
and on how available published cases have treated statutes govern-
ing involuntary hospitalization. We recognize, however, that civil
commitment proceedings are flexible in their actual operation and
that statutory wording may reveal little about how courts actually in-
terpret or implement laws concerning involuntary hospitalization.228
We also acknowledge that no published case has squarely addressed
whether ARAls may serve as the primary evidence to support inpa-
tient commitment -that is, as evidence adduced in the absence of an
overt act that would, by itself, satisfy the statutory requirement to
prove dangerousness. Finally, we note that in two jurisdictions that
ostensibly have overt act requirements, courts either have com-
mented favorably on ARAI-based evidence, 229 or have commented
with disfavor on commitment decisions that did not have ARAI-
based support.230
Even if courts with overt-act language insist that decisions order-
ing traditional mental health commitment require proof of actual
harmful behavior, courts may one day prefer ARAI-based testimony
about the probability of future harm, either to support opinions that
significant risk persists or simply as a sign of the testifying clinician's
ECONOMY 28-54 (2007).
227 "Risk" comes from Romance language words such as risque (French) and risco (Spanish),
meaning "rock." WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE, UNABRIDGED 1470 (1951). By referring to the etymological origins of "risk," we
are not suggesting that etymology has definitive implications for a word's meaning. See
Richard Nordquist, Introduction to Etymology: Word Histories, available at
http://grammar.about.com/od/words/a/Etymologywords.htm (last visited December 5,
2010) (noting that "the original meaning of a word is often different from its contemporary
definition" and using "salt" as an example).
228 See William H. Fisher et al., How Flexible Are Our Civil Commitment Statutes? 39 HosP. COMM.
PSYCHIATRY 711, 712 (1988) (noting that "[m]uch is made of the letter of commitment laws
and the behaviors and persons they do or do not encompass .... In fact, though, the 'spirit
of the law' is far more malleable and susceptible to influence by the public's perceived
needs or desires," and providing examples).
229 See supra notes 203-212 and accompanying text.
230 See supra notes 178-188 and accompanying text.
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thoroughness. Letting ARAls function these ways fits well with how
treating clinicians respond to the problems and needs of those of
their patients who become respondents in civil commitment proceed-
ings. Psychiatrists typically think of civil commitment as a vehicle for
making sure their patients get the treatment they need, having made
a clinical assessment that such treatment is critical.231 In urgent
treatment contexts, what psychiatrist Robert Simon calls "clinical risk
assessment" is a process that results in the identification of problems
and determinations of how to respond to those problems.232 Making
an analogy between what psychiatrists and other physicians do,
Simon suggests that ARAls should help clinicians to avoid overlook-
ing evidence-based risk factors when they undertake clinical assess-
ments.233 However, the reason for considering such factors is that
they tell clinicians what to do. "The psychiatrists' stock-in-trade is the
treatment and management of acutely mentally ill patients. Treat-
ment and risk reduction, not prediction, is their appropriate focus." 2 34
Courts in jurisdictions with overt act commitment requirements
may one day see their task and the evidentiary contribution of ARAls
similarly. At a hearing, the scientifically demonstrated validity of risk
factors can help courts feel confident in making the statutory connec-
tion between certain features of a respondent's mental illness and the
respondent's risk-generating behavior. Knowing this, courts will
have scientific as well as legal justification for imposing involuntary
231 See, e.g., B. Todd Thatcher & Douglas Mossman, Testifying for Civil Commibnent: Help Unwill-
ing Patients Get Treatment They Need, 8 CURRENT PSYCHIATRY 50, 51 (2009) (telling psychiatric
colleagues that providing testimony "is the only way to make sure dangerous patients get
the hospital care they need"); see also, Steven K. Hoge, Commentary: Resistance to Jackson v.
Indiana -Civil Commitment of Defendants I'ho Cannot be Restored to Competence, 38 J. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 359, 361(2010) (stating, "ordinary civil commitment is grounded in the
doctor-patient relationship and underlying medical ethics that require physicians to act in
patients' interests"); PAUL S. APPELBAUM & THOMAS G. GUTHEIL, CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF
PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 37 (4th ed. 2007) ("Often, the only reasonable option for dealing
with a psychiatric emergency is to seek the patient's hospitalization.").
232 Robert I. Simon, The Myth of "Imminent" Violence in Psychiatry and the Law, 75 U. CIN. L. REV.
631, 639 (2006).
233 Id. at 641 (noting that physicians regularly identify and seek to alleviate factors that increase
risk for heart disease without attempting or being able to predict who will actually have a
heart attack).
234 Id. at 639.
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treatment aimed at alleviating symptoms of mental illness and the re-
spondent's risk of harm.
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